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INTRODUCTION
This briefing paper provides preliminary analysis of two leaked U.S. proposals
for an intellectual property chapter in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement and of a related proposed chapter regulating pharmaceutical
reimbursement programs.1
The U.S. proposals, if adopted, would upset the current international framework
balancing the minimum standards for exclusive rights for media and technology
owners, on the one hand, and the access rights of the public, competitors, innovators
and creators, on the other. The proposed U.S. IP chapter greatly exceeds the
imperfect, but more balanced provisions codified in the 1994 WTO Trade‐Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement [hereinafter TRIPS].2 The
Trans‐Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter February Draft [hereinafter
TPP], available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp‐10feb2011‐us‐text‐ipr‐chapter.pdf;
Trans‐Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter September 2011 Draft (Selected
Provisions) [hereinafter TPP‐2], available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp‐
content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf; Transparency Chapter – Annex on Transparency
and Procedural Fairness for Healthcare Technologies June 22, 2011 Draft [hereinafter Transparency
Chapter] available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp‐
content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificTransparency.pdf.
2 Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 15, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments‐‐
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
1
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proposals are primarily based on, and frequently go beyond, the maximalist and
controversial standards of the Korea‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)3 and the
Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),4 neither of which was subject to an
open and transparent negotiation process. The provisions of the TPP proposals are
inconsistent with the current laws in every TPP member country for which public
analysis is available,5 including the U.S. itself.6 The proposal is also a new step for
U.S. international policy, abandoning the development‐oriented flexibilities on
access to medicines expressed in the 2007 New Trade Deal between Congress and
the Bush Administration.7
The U.S. combined proposals are particularly inappropriate for developing
countries where the risks and effects of exclusionary pricing by foreign monopolists
are most acute.8 The U.S. TPP proposals are the latest manifestation of its
maximalist agenda in international intellectual property,9 which stands in stark
3

Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S.
Korea, June 30, 2007 [hereinafter KORUS], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_
FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html.
4 Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA], available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final‐ACTA‐text‐following‐legal‐verification.pdf.
5 See Public Citizen, Comparative Analyses of the U.S. TransPacific Partnership IP Proposals and
Existing Laws in Participating Countries http://www.citizen.org/Trans‐pacific‐FTA‐charts
(comparing the leaked TPP IP chapter to the laws of Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, Peru).
6 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
7 New Trade Policy for America, House Committee on Ways and Means, [hereinafter New Trade
Policy], available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/NewTradePolicy.pdf. An extended
summary of the New Trade Policy provisions on patents/IPRs and access to medicines can be found
in Mac Dressler, American Trade Politics in 2007: Building Bipartisan Compromise, Policy Brief,
Peterson Institute for International Economics 25‐26 (May 2007) available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb07‐5.pdf. The New Trade Deal was included in revisions to
the U.S.‐Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and U.S.‐Colombia Free Trade Agreement IP Chapters.
U.S.‐Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Chapter 16 Intellectual Property Rights (revised June 29,
2007) available athttp://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1031; U.S.‐Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
Chapter 16 Intellectual Property Rights, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1336. See
Public Citizen Media Alert: On Access to Medicines, Obama Trade Pact Proposal Appears Set to Undo
BushEra Improvements. Public Citizen, 13 September 2011.
8 See Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Michael Palmedo, An Economic Argument for Open Access to
Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 184 (2009) (explaining that
intellectual monopolies in developing countries with high income inequality predictably lead to more
exclusionary pricing practices than in wealthier countries).
9 See Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, AntiCounterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement
Efforts: The State of Play, PIJIP Working Paper No. 15, at 3, available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/; see also Analysis of the Leaked New Zealand
Paper on the TransPacific Partnership Agreement and Intellectual Property, THIRD WORLD NETWORK &
3
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contrast to the “development agenda”10 being debated in more open, transparent
multilateral forums.11 Substantively, the development agenda is focused on
maximizing differentiation and flexibility in protection and enforcement, while
globalizing a set of mandatory minimum limitations and exceptions – including for
persons with visual impairments, for libraries, for educational uses and to promote
access to needed medicines and technologies. A summary of some the key
differences between the maximalist agenda and the development agenda are
included in the table below.

PUBLIC CITIZEN (Dec. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/analysisoftheleakednewzealandpaper.pdf (warning that “[a]ny
enforcement measures adopted in the TPPA would have to depart considerably from the global IP
Enforcement agenda that has emerged in recent years, or would be likely to undermine the culture of
flexibility and context in intellectual property rules.”).
10 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR WIPO (2007), available at
http://www.wipo.int/ip‐development/en/agenda/. For a declaration of principles of hundreds of
intellectual property academics and experts calling for a policy agenda more supportive of the public
interest, see THE GLOBAL CONG. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND THE PUB. INTEREST, WASHINGTON DECLARATION
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, available at http://infojustice.org/washington‐
declaration. See generally, Peter Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 465
(2009) (comparing present and past intellectual property policy agendas led by developing
countries).
11 See Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy Institutions 19–21 (PIJIP,
Research Paper No. 6, 2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=research.
4
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MAXIMALIST AGENDA

POSITIVE/DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

PROCESS: Plurilateral, unilateral; closed
processes

Multilateral; open processes
e.g. WIPO, WTO, WHO, UN.

e.g. ACTA, TPP, Special 301 Watch List.
SCOPE OF RIGHTS: Onesizefitsall rights;
voluntary limitations and exceptions
e.g. Expansions of trademark to non‐visual
identifiers, lengthening copyright terms, extension of
patents to new uses of known products.

ENFORCEMENT: Shift resources and
responsibility to public; summary processes with
minimal checks and balances.
e.g. ex parte, ex officio seizures and injunctions;
decreased evidentiary standards.

Differentiation in scope and enforcement of IPRs
and mandatory, minimum limitations and
exceptions
e.g. India sec. 3(d) (banning new use patents with no
increase in efficacy), WIPO proposed treaty for Visually
Impaired Persons.
Retain private burden of enforcement; maximize
due process for accused.
e.g. maintain enforcement processes in judicial forums
initiated by rights holders.

LIABILITY: shift criminal and civil liability to
endusers and intermediaries.

Target large commercial entities, high liability
thresholds.

e.g. redefine “commercial scale” to “indirect
economic advantage”; graduated response
obligations on internet; ISP and intermediary
liability; information disclosure mandates.

e.g. China’s qualitative (for profit) and quantitative
thresholds for criminal counterfeiting, upheld in U.S
China: Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
(WTO/DS362).

DAMAGES: “Deterrent” level penalties set
through statutory and presumed damages.

Damages adequate to compensate rights holder.

e.g. Tenenbaum case, $675,000 in damages for
uploading 30 songs to a sharing cite. Limewire
damage request ‐‐ $75 trillion.

e.g. TRIPS Art. 31(k) permitting zero royalty
compulsory licenses in cases of anticompetitive
conduct..

The U.S. TPP proposal includes a Transparency/Pharmaceutical Pricing Chapter
that has never been proposed for any developing country. The proposal extends
international minimum standards for domestic regulation beyond intellectual
property and into health policy itself. The chapter advances proposals that would
undermine countries’ policy space to adopt and enforce therapeutic formularies,
reimbursement policies and other price moderating mechanisms within public
health systems. The U.S. succeeded in obtaining similar chapters in trade
agreements with Australia and Korea, two OECD countries. These standards are
5
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inappropriate for developing countries. And in many ways the TPP proposal goes
further than these controversial agreements. Ironically, the substantive provisions
in the proposal (and included in the Australia and Korea agreements) are not
followed by U.S. pharmaceutical reimbursement programs, most notably Medicaid.
No country, including the U.S., has an interest in ceding this much policy
flexibility to an international agreement, particularly through an international
agreement subject to such a limited public process. As with the recently concluded
and highly criticized ACTA, the TPP proposal seeks to put in place a major and
consequential shift in international standards for domestic regulation with scant
public process, on the one side, and a highly structured and consultative
relationship with a limited range of commercial interests on the other. This process
denies TPP negotiators access to a full range of views and analysis that deliberation
in a public forum would attract. A better process would be to reject the U.S. TPP
proposal in its entirety and limit any intellectual property, internet and
pharmaceutical regulations to standards already adopted through an open and
transparent multilateral process.12

SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS
This part summarizes the many ways in which the U.S. proposal for the IP
chapter of TPP implements and exceeds the TRIPS‐plus provisions of ACTA, KORUS,
and U.S. law. The U.S. TPP proposal would:
• Expand the scope of trademark protection to sounds, scents and “well
known” marks that are not well known in the local territory, while
diluting geographic indication protections – all in direct contravention to
flexibilities in TRIPS allowing policy choice in these areas.
•

Adopt provisions on internet domain names that would preempt expert
discussions on this very topic in ICANN's multi‐stakeholder forum.

•

Dramatically expand international obligations on the length and scope of
copyrights, including extending protection to “temporary” storage on the

See Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest. Washington D.C.,
August 2011. Available at: http://infojustice.org/washington‐declaration (“International intellectual
property policy affects a broad range of interests within society, not just those of rights holders.
Thus, intellectual property policy making should be conducted through mechanisms of transparency
and openness that encourage broad public participation.”). Somewhat ironically, the closed‐door
process for policy making being used in TPP violates the standards included in the leaked chapters
on “Regulatory Coherence” and “Transparency and Procedural Fairness for Healthcare
Technologies,” for example. See leaked text available at
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2011/10/22/leaked‐trans‐pacific‐fta‐texts‐reveal‐u‐s‐
undermining‐access‐to‐medicine/
12
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internet and doubling the mandatory minimum length of many copyright
terms.
•

Require the adoption of a highly controversial form of anti‐circumvention
liability that would punish circumvention of digital locks regardless of
intent.

•

Expand the international mandatory scope of patentability to include
monopoly protections for (1) new uses or forms of known products, and
(2) for plants, animals, and medical procedures. The first set of standards
is in direct conflict with the anti‐evergreening provisions recently
enacted in India and Philippines. The second set of standards is direct
conflict with the flexibility in Section 27.3 of TRIPS.

•

Alter the international legislative framework on patent applications,
oppositions, revocation, required disclosure and utility standards to make
patents easier to obtain, harder to challenge or revoke, and less beneficial
to technology transfer.

•

Abandon the access to medicines flexibilities of the 2007 New Trade Deal
and the U.S.‐Peru Free Trade Agreement and put in their place a set of
patent extensions and registration monopolies for branded drugs
conditioned only on compliance with an “access window” defined without
regard to affordability. These provisions will predictably lead to higher
prices and lower availability of pharmaceutical products, especially in
developing countries.

•

Implement the most draconian enforcement provisions of ACTA and U.S.
law to shift the cost and burden of enforcing private intellectual property
rights enforcement to the government, internet and other intermediaries
and consumers, while reducing due process and administrative justice
rights in their implementation.

•

Export a new and controversial set of restrictions on the efficacy of price
negotiations in pharmaceutical reimbursement programs that have never
before been proposed for developing countries and that are not adhered
to in the U.S. itself.

Each of these points is explained more fully below.

7
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I.

TRADEMARKS, INCLUDING GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

A. Art. 2.1 – Protectable Trademark Subject Matter
TPP Art. 2.113 would expand the mandatory scope of trademark protection by
deleting the TRIPS Art. 15 flexibility that a country may require “as a condition of
registration, that a sign be visually perceptible.”14 It additionally prohibits a Party
from denying “registration of a trademark solely on the grounds that the sign of
which it is composed is a sound or a scent.”
This provision is identical to Art. 18.2.1 of the U.S.‐South Korea Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS)15 and incorporates the scope of trademark subject matter
under § 45 of the U.S. Lanham Act. The latter has been interpreted to include, inter
alia, colors per se, 2D/3D designs, motion marks, sound (NBC’s three chimes16),
scent (plumeria blossoms on sewing thread17), and non‐visual marks.18
The risk of the provision is that, by removing the requirement that a trademark
be a visual mark, it will carry other countries along the U.S. path of transforming
trademark law into a species of general (and perpetual) monopoly protection,
including for products that cannot obtain copyright or patent protection.19
B. FN 4 – Definition of “Geographical Indications”
While the U.S. proposal expands the scope of trademark protection, it restricts
the operation of geographical indications as a field of protection distinguishable
from trademark. The first encroachment on this field is contained in the definition in

As noted above, throughout this analysis the U.S. TPP proposal is referred to merely as “TPP.”
This reference therefore refers to Art. 2.1 of the U.S. TPP proposal as leaked to the public in February
2011, supra note 1.
14
Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 15, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments‐‐
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
15
Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S.
Korea, June 30, 2007 [hereinafter KORUS], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_
FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html.
16
NBC’s 3-Note Chime, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/soundex/72349496.mp3.
17
In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1238, 1240 (TTAB 1990) (allowing registration of plumeria
blossom scented sewing thread).
18
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. TRADEMARK LAW – RULES OF PRACTICE & FEDERAL
STATUTES § 2.25(e) (explaining that “[a]n applicant is not required to submit a drawing if the mark consists
only of a sound, a scent, or other completely non-visual matter.”).
19 See Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) (criticizing the shift in
U.S. trademark law away from a consumer protection motivation).
13
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footnote 4, but continues in other sections as described below. Footnote 4 broadens
the TRIPS Art. 22.1 definition of a geographic indicator (GI), 20 requiring the
protection of a “sign or combination of signs . . . in any form whatsoever.”21 The
non‐exhaustive list of examples of “sign or combination of signs” contains many
elements similar to protectable trademarks, such as personal names, letters,
numerals, figurative elements, and colors, including color per se.22
C. Art. 2.4 – Identical/Similar Signs and Identical/Similar/Related Goods or Services
TPP Art. 2.4 expands the scope of trademark protection in TRIPS Art. 16.1 from
prohibiting the use of identical or similar signs “for identical or similar goods or
services” to a prohibition of the use of similar signs “for goods and services that are
related to those goods or services in respect of which the owner’s trademark is
registered.”23 The impact of this change in standards is unclear. Presumably a good
could be “related to” the trademarked good without being identical or similar to it.
This raises the possibility that trademark will be used to cut off uses of marks that
are not confusing consumers or competing with the branded product at all – making
trademark a new form of monopoly protection rather than a consumer protection
norm.24
Unlike TRIPS, the U.S. TPP proposal includes GI’s within the purview of this
provision. This is another instance of the apparent aim of the proposal to reduce GI
protection to that of trademark.
D. Arts. 2.6, 2.7, and FN 5 – Well‐Known Marks & the “Use In Commerce” Standard
TPP Art. 2.6 exports the “use in commerce" standard of trademark protection in
the U.S. The “use in commerce” standard in § 1 of the Lanham Act provides the
fundamental basis for trademark protection in the United States.25 Unlike in other
TRIPS Art. 22.1 (defining ‘geographical indications’ as “indications which identify a good as
originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality,
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”).
21
TPP FN4.
22
Id.
23
TPP Art. 2.4 (emphasis added). Compare to TRIPS Art. 16.1 (stating that “[t]he owner of a
registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s
consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are
identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would
result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or
services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.”).
24 See Mark McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63
(2009).
25
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2005); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ALL ABOUT
TRADEMARKS, available at http://www.uspto.gov/smallbusiness/trademarks/registering.html
20
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jurisdictions, this standard does not require registration as a condition precedent
for trademark protection.26
In defining a “well‐known mark”, TPP FN 5 twists the language of TRIPS Art.
16.2, which requires that, “[i]n determining whether a trademark is well‐known,
Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant
sector of the public.” The TRIPS provision is open ended. Members may also take
into consideration other factors. The TPP proposal turns the TRIPS language into a
closed list, banning any other consideration than whether the reputation of the well‐
known in “sector of the public that normally deals with the relevant goods or
services.”
E. Arts. 2.15, 2.18 – Refusing Protection or Recognition of GI
Articles 2.15 and 2.18 continue the trend of refusing to fully recognize
geographical indicators at the TRIPS standard.
1.

Art. 2.15

TPP Art. 2.15 makes GIs a subsidiary doctrine to trademark. TRIPS Art. 22
protects GIs by requiring parties to prevent designation of geographical origin
where such designation “misleads the public as to the true place of origin.”27 TPP
Art. 2.15 changes this focus on geographic origin confusion by prohibiting the use of
a GI that is “likely to cause confusion with a trademark.” The provision thus alters
the fundamental focus of GI protection from the protection of goods from a specific
place of origin to the protection of goods with specific trademark or indication,
giving priority to trademarks over GIs in the case of conflict between the two.
2.

Art. 2.18

Article 2.18 defines a generic GI in a way that would allow one country’s generic
use of a term to defeat a claim of a GI that is protected in another country. TPP Art.
2.15(a)(iv) recognizes that generic terms should not be protected as GIs. TPP Art.
2.18 notes that “a term is generic if it is the term customary in common language as
the common name for the goods or services associated with the trademark or
geographical indication.”28 This definition is similar to TRIPS Art. 24.6,29 but omits
(explaining the required steps for trademark protection in the United States).
26
Trademark Protection in France, EURIMARK,
http://www.eurimark.com/index.php/de/nationales‐recht/45‐france/135‐french‐trademarks
(explaining that “[u]se of a Trademark in France does not confer any rights without a trademark
registration to support it.”).
27
TRIPS Art. 22.
28
TPP Art. 2.18.
29 “Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in respect of a
10
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the restriction that the term should have become generic “in the territory of the
Member.”30 This appears to open the possibility that a GI term could be considered
generic in one country (e.g. Peru) because it has become generic in another member
country (e.g. U.S.).
F. Art. 2.22 – GI Use for Goods and Services Not From the True Place of Origin
Continuing the proposal’s recognition of trademarks as superior to GI protection,
TPP Art. 2.22 permits the use or registration of signs or indications that reference a
geographical area even though it is not the true place or origin of the goods or
services.

II.

DOMAIN NAMES ON THE INTERNET

TPP Art. 3.1 requires that country‐code top‐level domain (ccTLD) provide
dispute settlement based on principles established in the Uniform Domain‐Name
Dispute‐Resolution Policy. TPP Art. 3.2 requires that there be online public access to
a reliable and accurate database of contact information concerning domain‐name
registrants. These requirements are in KORUS, but do not appear in TRIPS.
As explained in a note provided by cyberlaw expert Wendy Seltzer, these
provisions preempt expert policy debates currently under way at the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN):31
As the United States knows, both the UDRP and WHOIS are subjects of active policy
debate in ICANN's multi‐stakeholder forum. It damages that process to freeze elements
of it through trade agreements.
Country Code TLDs (ccTLDs, such as .uk, .br, .pe, .mx) are operated by groups in their
countries, some governmental, some not. They are not under contract to ICANN (unlike
the generic TLDs), and are free to develop their own policies, to reflect their own
national laws and local needs. Extending U.S.‐based law to them would deprive us of the
experimentation and better speech‐protections they can offer. (Domain names matter
both for their expressive value as pointers to speech, and for the speech they convey
directly.)
The UDRP was one of the earliest‐established ICANN policies for gTLDs. More than a
decade ago, it was put in place as an arbitration‐like procedure for domain/trademark
disputes. Since then, several academic studies have cataloged its procedural and

geographical indication of any other Member with respect to goods or services for which the relevant
indication is identical with the term customary in common language as the common name for such
goods or services in the territory of that Member.”
30
TRIPS Art. 24.6 (defining generic as “the term customary in common language as the common
name for such goods or services in the territory of that Member”).
31 Letter from Wendy Seltzer, Fellow, Yale Law School Info. Soc’y Project, to Sean Flynn, Assoc.
Dir., Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual Prop. (Oct. 31, 2011).
11
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substantive problems, such as forum shopping and unfairness to domain registrants
with criticism and parody domains,32 and many within ICANN's GNSO have called for the
UDRP's review. Some ccTLDs have modified procedures based on the UDRP.
For example, Nominet, the .uk registry, has a dispute policy based on the UDRP's
framework but with greater free‐speech protections, and specific reference to fair use
defenses.
WHOIS, the public listing of contact info of domain registrants, is another hotly
contested issue here at ICANN. The Article 29 Working Party of European data
protection commissioners found likely conflicts with privacy laws,33 and these
identification databases pose serious problems to speakers and critics in hostile
regimes. Iranian activists in the green movement have been questioned in police
detention about people identified in domains' WHOIS records.34

The proposal is also counter to existing ICAAN Principles for the Delegation and
Administration of ccTLDs, which “should recognise that ultimate public policy
authority over the relevant ccTLD rests with the relevant government or public
authority."35 The WSIS Tunis Agenda for the Information Society – agreed upon by
the UN‐sponsored World Summit on the Information Society in 2005 – similarly
states that “Countries should not be involved in decisions regarding another
country’s country‐code Top‐Level Domain (ccTLD). Their legitimate interests, as
expressed and defined by each country, in diverse ways, regarding decisions
affecting their ccTLDs, need to be respected, upheld and addressed via a flexible and
improved framework and mechanisms.”36

III.

COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS

A. Art. 4.1– Exclusive Reproduction Rights
The U.S. proposal includes many dramatic expansions of the international
See Comments of the Noncommercial Users Constituency (NCUC) on the Preliminary GNSO
Issue Report on the Current State of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), available at
http://forum.icann.org/lists/prelim‐report‐udrp/pdfn9gXwk5UTa.pdf.
33 See Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman, Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, to Vinton G.
Cerf, Chairman of Bd. Of Dir., Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (June
22, 2006), available at http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/schaar‐to‐cerf‐22jun06.pdf.
34 For an older sample of the still‐ongoing debate, see Wendy Seltzer, WHOIS redux: Demand
privacy in domain name registration, SELTZER.ORG (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/archives/2007/10/25/whois‐redux‐demand‐privacy‐in‐domain‐
name‐registration.html.
35 Principles for Delegation and Administration of ccTLDs, Presented by Governmental Advisory
Committee. 23 February 2000. Available at http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/gac‐
cctldprinciples‐23feb00.htm
36 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WSIS‐05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)‐E. 18 November
2005. Available at: http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html
32
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minimum standards on the scope and length of copyright protection, including
provisions not reflected in current U.S. law.
TPP Art. 4.1 grants intellectual property rights holders the exclusive right to
“prohibit all reproduction . . . in any manner or form, permanent or temporary
(including temporary storage in electronic form).” Although the language of the U.S.
proposed TPP Art. 4.1 was included in KORUS, it is not fully present in U.S.
Copyright law. Section § 106(1) of the Copyright Act does not prohibit reproduction
“in any form.” It rather prohibits reproduction of the “copyrighted works in copies
or phonorecords.”37 Nor does U.S. law include an extension to “temporary storage in
electronic form.” U.S. law requires that a copy be “fixed,” meaning “sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”38 The DMCA
recognizes a safe harbor for “system caching,”39 which is not included in the U.S. TPP
proposal.
The distinctions are particularly important for enforcement of copyright on the
internet. Lower courts in the U.S. have, for example, held that copyright does not
extend to buffer copies on the internet.40 Similarly, although not a party to this
agreement, the EU Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC, Article 5) contains
an explicit exception for temporary reproductions addressing automated caching.
The proposed TPP language could threaten these types of limitations and exceptions
in TPP member countries.
It is noteworthy that the TPP language appears to derive from proposals that
were rejected in the negotiation of the Basic Proposal for the 1996 WIPO treaties.
Language addressing temporary copies was considered in these negotiations but
ultimately left out of the treaties. The U.S. proposal seeks to revive debate of these
rejected norms in a more limited forum with insufficient transparency.
B. Art. 4.2 – Parallel Importation
TPP article 4.2 would create a new international legal requirement to provide
See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
38
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining that “[c]opies” are material objects, other than
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes the material object, other than a
phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”).
39 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (1998).
40
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that
buffer copies are saved for ‘more than transitory duration’ and are therefore insufficient for a work
to be ‘fixed’).
37
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copyright owners an exclusive right to block “parallel trade” of copyrighted works –
meaning the importation of a copyrighted work from one country where the good is
voluntarily placed on the market to another country where the same good at the
same price is unavailable.41 The language of the U.S. proposed TPP Art. 4.2 is not
consistent with current U.S. law, is not required by any multilateral agreement and
is not in the best interests of TPP member countries.42
The issue of parallel trade arises because rights owners desire the ability to
segment markets and determine their own prices and policies for entry into each
market. Many countries are disadvantaged by such rights, particularly where they
lack a sufficient consumer base to attract market entry at the lowest possible prices.
Parallel trade allows distributors to seek supplies of the legitimate copyrighted
work in another market where the good is available. If for example, as is often the
case, a text book is sold at a higher price in a poor country than in a wealthier one, a
supplier in the poor country could purchase the book in the lower priced market
and resell it in the domestic market – benefiting both consumers and the local firm.
In recognition of the divergence of legitimate policies between countries, the
WTO TRIPS agreement leaves countries free adopt domestic policies on parallel
importation through their regimes of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.43
The extension of copyrights to parallel trade is unsettled in current U.S. law. The
issue was recently litigated in the Supreme Court in Costco v. Omega, but the split
decision did not finally resolve whether copyrights prevent parallel importation in
the U.S. Regardless, as explained above, many countries in the TPP membership will
have different economic interests than the U.S. and may legitimately desire different
exhaustion regimes. A recent study in New Zealand for example, described by
Alberto Cerda of Knowledge Ecology International, found that its 1998 lifting of
bans on parallel importation of copyrighted goods “has not affected the investment
in and promotion of New Zealand creative sector, but improved choices and quality
of services to retailers and consumers through increased competition, a result
similar to Australia.”44
Art. 4.2 (“Each Party shall provide to authors, performers, and producers of phonograms the
right to authorize or prohibit the importation into that Party’s territory of copies of the work,
performance, or phonogram made without authorization, or made outside that Party’s territory with
the authorization of the author, performer, or producer of the phonogram”).
42 See Alberto Cerda, USTR New Exclusive Right for Copyright Holders: Importation Provision in the
Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) (July 5, 2011) http://keionline.org/node/1176
43 TRIPS Art. 6 (providing that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights”).
44 Alberto Cerda, USTR New Exclusive Right for Copyright Holders: Importation Provision in the
Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) (July 5, 2011) http://keionline.org/node/1176 (citing
the 1998 New Zealand Copyright (Removal of Prohibition on Parallel Importing) Amendment Act and
the government’s 2005 Cabinet Paper on Parallel Importing and the Creative Industries,
41
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C. Art. 4.5 – Terms of Copyright Protection
TPP Art. 4.5 attempts to export the TRIPS‐plus and KORUS‐plus copyright terms
of U.S. law—life of the author plus 70 years, or not less than 95 years from the first
publication or 120 years from creation.45 Adoption of this provision would double
many copyright terms from the TRIPS minimums of publication plus 50 years, or 50
years from creation.46
Although the life of the author plus 70 years standard of TPP Art. 4.5 is
consistent with U.S. Copyright Act §§ 302(a)‐(b), TPP sets the specified terms as the
minimum level of protection, whereas U.S. law sets this limit as the ceiling of the
term.47 TPP Art. 4.5(b) also fails to incorporate the U.S. law presumption that after
95 years from first publication or 120 years after creation, an author’s death is
presumed,48 which can assist some works in entering the public domain.
Length of copyright terms is an area of law where the U.S. model should not be
considered an appropriate standard for the rest of the world. The latest terms in the
U.S. are the result of the controversial and much criticized “Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act” of 1998, extending the already TRIPS‐plus and frequently
criticized copyright terms by another 20 years. As a coalition of law professors
reported to Congress in opposition to that act at the time, the lengthening of
copyright terms “impose severe costs on the American public without providing any
public benefit. It would supply a windfall to the heirs and assignees of dead authors
(i.e., whose works were first published around 1920) and deprive living authors of
the ability to build on the cultural legacy of the past.”49 These views are supported
by numerous academic studies finding no public benefit, but great public cost, from
extending copyright terms to the current U.S. levels.50
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____5706.aspx).
45
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2002) (specifying the duration of copyright for works created on or after
1/1/78).
46 TRIPS Art. 12. The proposal is also in excess of KORUS Art. 18.4.4, providing for terms to be not
less than 70 years from the end of the calendar year of the first authorized publication.
47 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
48
17 U.S.C. § 302(e) (“After a period of 95 years from the year of first publication of a work, or a
period of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first, any person who obtains
from the Copyright Office a certified report that the records . . . disclose nothing to indicate that the
author of the work is living, or died less than 70 years before, is entitled to the benefit of a
presumption that the author has been dead for at least 70 years.”).
49 Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors on the Public Harm from
Copyright Extension,
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/opposingcopyrightextension/commentary/opedltr.html
50 See, e.g., DOUGLAS GOMERY, RESEARCH REPORT: THE ECONOMICS OF TERM EXTENSION FOR MOTION
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D. Art. 4.7(b)
TPP Art. 4.7 would require that parties provide any person “acquiring or holding
any economic right in a work” by virtue of a contract, “be able to exercise that right
in that person’s own name and enjoy fully the benefits derived from that right.” As
Jodie Griffin of Public Knowledge notes, this provision is likely consistent with U.S.
law but “could be construed to grant authorship to employers or contractors
without meeting the requirements [of] the work made for hire definition in §101” of
the U.S. Copyright Act, and could also conflict with termination rights in §203.
E. Arts. 4.9(a), 16.3 – Technological Protection Measures
TPP Art. 4.9 proposes new anti‐circumvention standards that go beyond the high
and controversial standards included in the Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA, Art. 27.6(a)(i)), and KORUS (Art. 18.4.7(a)(i)), and are not fully consistent
with current U.S. law.
Policies governing the creation or use of circumvention technology must be
carefully crafted to avoid dampening technological innovation and freedom of
speech. There are many lawful and appropriate uses of technologies that permit
copying of digitally locked material. Documentary filmmakers, for example, may use
such devices to lawfully quote other films in their new works. And it is lawful under
U.S. law to “jailbreak” a locked phone to run software not authorized by the
hardware seller.
The ACTA and KORUS anti‐circumvention standards are very strong and
controversial forms of these norms. The TPP proposal is more extreme, eliminating
from these standards the requirement that any punished use of circumvention
equipment occur “knowingly or having reasonable grounds to know” that the action
is illegal.51 The TPP standard would thus appear to allow the punishment of
circumvention of technical protection measures regardless of any intent to infringe
copyright. The TPP also removes the proviso in ACTA that the minimum standards
PICTURES; Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14, Cardozo Arts &
Entertainment Law Journal 655 (1996); Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of Copyright, in GROWING PAINS:
ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SOCIETY (LAURA N. GASAWAY ED., PUBLISHED BY FRED B.
ROTHMAN & CO. 1997); Cecil C. Kuhne III, The Steadily Shrinking Public Domain: Inefficiencies of
Existing Copyright Law in the Modern Technology Age, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 549‐563 (2004); Edward
Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, May 11, 1998; J.H.Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of
Cultural Policy, 14 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment L.J. 625 (1996). See also Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 281, 324 (1970) (opposing what became the 1976 extensions).
51 ACTA Art. 27.6(a)(i) (prohibiting “the unauthorized circumvention of an effective
technological measure carried out knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know.”).
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only apply to anti‐circumvention measures “to the extent provided by its law,”
which is a potentially broad exception allowing countries without such protection in
their current law to continue not providing such protections.
The TPP proposal is not entirely consistent with U.S. law.
•

Whereas DMCA § 1201(a)(2)(C) prohibits products “marketed” for use in
circumventing a technological protection measure,52 TPP Art.
4.9(a)(ii)(A) extends to products that are “promoted, advertised” for this
purpose.

•

DMCA § 1201(a)(2)(A) extends only to products designed “for the
purpose of circumventing,” while the TPP 4.9(a)(ii)(C) extends to any
product “for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention,” a
potentially broader standard.53 This also goes beyond ACTA Art.
27.6(a)(ii).54

•

Art. 4.9(a), by virtue of the requirement to include “the remedies and
authorities listed in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (f) of Article [15.5] as
applicable to infringements,” requires “the imposition of actual terms of
imprisonment when criminal infringement is undertaken for commercial
advantage or private financial gain.” This is inconsistent with 17 U.S.C. §
1204, which permits fines or imprisonment for violations of anti‐
circumvention standards.55

F. Art. 4.9(d) – Exceptions and Limitations
TPP Art. 4.9 proposes confining limitations and exceptions to circumvention
liability to a set of provisions that are similar to, but not identical to, the various
exceptions and limitations in DMCA § 1201.56 Adopting this standard would restrict
countries from developing their own exceptions to liability not based on present U.S.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (prohibiting product, service, device, component, or part thereof that
“is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's
knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title.”).
53 Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
54
ACTA Art. 27.6(a)(ii) (prohibiting “the offering to the public by marketing of a device or
product, including computer programs, or a service, as a means of circumventing an effective
technological measure.”).
55 Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
56 See TPP Art. 4.9(d) (providing that parties “shall confine exceptions and limitations to
measures implementing subparagraph (a) to the following activities”).
52
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law. ACTA more broadly permits parties to “adopt or maintain appropriate
limitations or exceptions” to anti‐circumvention liability and clarifies that
circumvention liability obligations are “without prejudice to the rights, limitations,
exceptions, or defences to copyright or related rights infringement under a Party’s
law.”57
The TPP proposal does not track the DMCA limitations in every detail.
Importantly, Art. 4.9(d)(viii) raises the evidentiary standard currently applied in
U.S. law to develop anti‐circumvention exceptions. As explained by Jodie Griffen of
Public Knowledge, the U.S. Library of Congress currently grants exemptions to U.S.
anti‐circumvention restrictions where there is “sufficient evidence” of a substantial
adverse effect on non‐infringing uses, and has noted that “how much evidence is
sufficient will vary,” and “is never the only consideration in the rulemaking
process.”58 TPP Art. 4.6(viii) raises the standard from “sufficient evidence” to
“substantial evidence” and implies that this evidence would be the only factor in the
determination.59
G. Art. 4.10 – Rights Management Information
TPP Art. 4.10 proposes a new regime of protection of rights management
information that lowers the threshold for violation and expands the scope of
prohibited activities. The standard proposed goes beyond similar TRIPS‐plus
provisions in KORUS, ACTA, and DMCA.60
Current U.S. law only prohibits the distribution, importation or public
performance of works knowing that rights management information has been
removed or altered. 61 The TPP proposal also prohibits a person from broadcasting,
communicating, or making available the work to the public. 62 It is noteworthy that
ACTA § 5, Art. 27.8.
Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf (quoting 73 Fed. Reg.
58075).
59 TPP Art. 4.9(d)(viii) (permitting exceptions for “noninfringing uses of a work, performance, or
phonogram in a particular class of works, performances, or phonograms when an actual or likely
adverse impact on those noninfringing uses is demonstrated in a legislative or administrative
proceeding by substantial evidence; provided that any limitation or exception adopted in reliance
upon this clause shall have effect for a renewable period of not more than three years from the date
of conclusion of such proceeding.”).
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202; ACTA Art. 27.7; KORUS Art. 18.4.8(a).
61
17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) (“distribute, import for distribution, or publicly perform works, copies
of works, or phonorecords, knowing that copyright management information has been removed or
altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law.”).
62 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
57
58
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the “making available” standard is in other U.S. free trade agreements and in the
WIPO copyright treaties, but is not reflected in U.S. law.
The definition of “rights management information” in TPP Art. 4.10(c) is similar
to that in the DMCA, except it specifically omits the exception for “public
performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations” in DMCA §§
1202(c)(4),(5).63
H. Art. 5 – “Making available”
TPP Art. 5 would require each party to provide the exclusive right to prohibit the
“making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the
public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chose by
them.” There is a circuit split on the issue of whether §106(3) of the U.S. Copyright
Act includes a “making available” right absent actual transfer.64
I. Art. 6: Related Rights
TPP Art. 6 incorporates various provisions from the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)65 and KORUS. There are some provisions that exceed
even these agreements.
•

TPP Art. 6.1 closely resembles KORUS Art. 18.6.1 but adds the last
sentence, “[a] performance or phonogram shall be considered first
published in the territory of a Party in which it is published within 30
days of its original publication.”

•

TPP Art. 6.3 adds to KORUS Art. 18.6.3 and WPPT Art. 10 “producers of
phonograms” in addition to performers.

•

TPP Art. 6.5 alters the KORUS definition of “broadcasting” by adding that
it does not include transmissions over computer networks or any
transmission where the time and place of reception may be individually
chosen by members of the public (e.g. Netflix, Hulu). The U.S. Copyright

17 U.S.C. §§ 1202(c)(4), (5) (“(4) With the exception of public performances of works by radio
and television broadcast stations, the name of, and other identifying information about, a performer
whose performance is fixed in a work other than an audiovisual work. (5) With the exception of
public performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations, in the case of an audiovisual
work, the name of, and other identifying information about, a writer, performer, or director who is
credited in the audiovisual work.”). See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific
Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US Law, Public Knowledge,
www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
64 Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
65
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted by
Diplomatic Conference at Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [WPPT].
63
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Act does not include this definition.66

IV.

PATENTS

A. Arts. 8.1, 8.12 FN 15 – Easing and Expanding Standards of Patentability
TPP Art. 8.1 contains a controversial TRIPS‐plus provision, most relevant to
pharmaceutical patents, that the scope of patentability include “any new forms,
uses, or methods of using a known product; and a new form, use, or method of using
a known product . . . , even if such invention does not result in the enhancement of
the known efficacy of that product”. This language goes far beyond definition of
patentability contained in TRIPS Art. 27.1, which merely states that “patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial applicability.”67
Art. 8.1 could require countries to open flood gates to patent applications on
minor modifications or variations of existing chemical entities; on new uses or
methods of using existing medicines,68 or on new formulations, dosages, and
combinations.69 Countries would be required to do so even if there is no
enhancement of therapeutic efficacy – indeed there could be a decrease in
therapeutic effect. Each new patent on new forms, uses, or formulation of an existing
medical product will result in a new 20‐year patent running from the date of patent
application, thereby “evergreening” monopoly rights on the underlying medical
product.70
TPP Art. 8.1 is inconsistent with the laws of other TPP negotiating countries,
including Australia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.71 But the most direct target of the
See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
67 TPP Art. 8.1 also goes beyond KORUS Art. 18.8.1, which altered that TRIPS standard by adding
“each Party confirms that patents shall be available for any uses or methods of using a known
product.”
68 See Graciela Andrei et al, Topical Tenofovir, a Microbicide Effective against HIV, Inhibits Herpes
Simplex Virus2 Replication, 10 CELL HOST & MICROBE, 379‐89 (2011) ( describing use of tenofovir, and
AIDS drug, to treat hepatitis for herpes simplex virus‐2 prophylaxis).
69 e.g. heat‐stable ritonavir/lopinavir or extended release formulations.
70 For example, since the filing of the original patent application on ritonavir in 1980 there have
been over 800 families of ever‐greening patent applications, most first filed in the U.S. Those patent
applications filed in 2009 will extend exclusivity period from the original 2000 date to 2029 –
twenty‐nine extra years and counting. See World Intellectual Property Organization, PATENT
LANDSCAPE REPORT ON RITONAVIR (2011), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/patentscope/en/programs/patent_landscapes/reports/do
cuments/ritonavir_plr_08112011_with_old_cover.pdf. Note, some of the ritonavir patents filed are
process rather than product patents.
71 See Dangers for Access to Medicines in the TransPacific Partnership Agreement: Comparative
Analysis of the U.S. Intellectual Property Proposal and Australian Law, PUBLIC CITIZEN, [hereinafter
66

20

Public Interest Analysis
section is probably India, although India is not a TPP party.72 The TPP proposal is
clearly drafted to counter the policy embodied in the 2005 Amended India Patents
Act section 3(d)73, which prohibits the granting of patents for “the mere discovery of
a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the
known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new
use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or
apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant.” India’s section 3(d) was enacted to reduce ever‐greening of
pharmaceutical patents, and is widely recognized as a pro‐public health and TRIPS‐
compliant exception to patentability.74 It has been offered as a model for other
developing countries to follow.75
B. Art. 8.2 – Eliminating Exclusions from Scope of Patentable Subject Matter
In direct contradiction to TRIPS Art. 27.3, TPP Art. 8.2 would require that “each
party shall make patents available for . . . (a) plants and animals, and; (b) diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.” The
application of patents to these areas, mirrored in KORUS Art. 18.8.2,76 is expressly
Public Citizen TPP‐Australian Law Comparison], available at
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=5025&frcrld=1; Dangers for Access to Medicines in the Trans
Pacific Partnership Agreement: Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Intellectual Property Proposal and
Malaysian Law, PUBLIC CITIZEN, [hereinafter Public Citizen TPP‐Malaysian Law Comparison], available
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Malaysia‐chart.pdf; Vietnam and the TransPacific Partnership
Agreement: Access to Medicines Risk for a PEPFAR Partner, PUBLIC CITIZEN & HEALTH GAP, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Vietnam‐and‐the‐Trans‐Pacific‐Partnership‐Agreement.pdf.
72 Public Citizen, Health GAP, IMAK & Third World Network, Briefing Memo: Analysis of the Leaked
U.S. Paper on Eliminating Patent PreGrant Opposition, PUBLIC CITIZEN (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/analysis‐of‐leaked‐US‐paper‐on‐eliminating‐pregrant‐
opposition.pdf
73 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3, India Code (2005).
74
MSF Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, TPP Issue Brief – September 2011,
[hereinafter MSF TPP Issue Brief] available at
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/2011/MSF‐TPP‐Issue‐Brief.pdf; see Janice M.
Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of
Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and
its Discontent: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV.
1571‐1650 (2009); Sudip Chaudhuri, Chan Park & K. M. Gopakumar, FIVE YEARS INTO THE PRODUCT
PATENT REGIME: INDIA’S RESPONSE (2010), available at
apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s17761en/s17761en.pdf..
75 Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public
Health Perspective 6–25 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/
docs/Correa_Patentability%20Guidelines.pdf (drawing on sec. 3(d), and recommending that
developing countries adopt comparable strict patentability standards, e.g., that they treat new
formulations, compositions, salt patents, and enantiomers as obvious and/or as exceptions to
patentability).
76
KORUS Art. 18.8.2 (preventing the exclusion of “diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical
procedures for the treatment of humans or animals.”).
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contrary to the right to exclude patents on such subject matter found in TRIPS Art.
27.3.77 TPP art. 8.2 is also contrary to the actual practice of U.S. law which allows
patents on medical procedures but precludes use of such patents to seek remedies
against medical practitioners.78 The provision runs counter to the current law in
several TPP member countries.79
C. Art. 8.7 – Limiting Revocation and Eliminating Pre‐Grant Opposition
TPP art. 8.7 contains TRIPS‐plus restrictions on the grounds for patent
revocation and on processes for permitting pre‐grant opposition of patent
applications.
TRIPS Art. 32 requires “[a]n opportunity for judicial review of any decision to
revoke or forfeit a patent.” The TPP proposal, modeled on KORUS Art. 18.8.4,
restricts the grounds upon which a patent may be revoked to “grounds that would
have justified a refusal to grant the patent,” and specifies that such grounds to
include fraud, misrepresentation or inequitable conduct. Under TRIPS art. 32 there
are no limitations on grounds for revocation, only a requirement of judicial review;
likewise under the earlier Paris Convention, countries have the right to revoke a
patent, including specifically for any abuse of the patent that cannot be remedied
through a compulsory license.80
TPP Art. 8.7 additionally restricts the use of pre‐grant oppositions. It provides
that if proceedings permit a third party to oppose the grant of a patent, the “Party
shall not make such proceedings available before the grant of the patent.” Pre‐grant
oppositions allow opportunities to contest a patent as it is filed, providing a
potentially important source of information to patent examiners and generally
improving patent quality.81 The U.S. has justified this restriction (in a leaked
TRIPS Art. 27.3 (emphasis added) (which provides that “[m]embers may also exclude from
patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals; (b) plants and animals other than micro‐organisms, and essentially biological processes for
the production of plants or animals other than non‐biological and microbiological processes.
78 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
79 See PUBLIC CITIZEN & HEALTH GAP (noting that the laws in “Vietnam and many other countries
exclude diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods from patentability.”); Public Citizen TPP‐
Australian Law Comparison (noting that the proposed language would eliminate a flexibility
recognized by Art. 17.9.2 of AUSFTA); Public Citizen TPP‐Malaysian Law Comparison (explaining that
Section 13(1) of Malaysia’s Patents Act of 291 of 1983 “expressly excludes treatment by surgery or
therapy and diagnostic methods on the living human or animal body from patent protection.”).
80 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 5(A)(3).
81 See Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M Scherer, Katrin Vopel, Erratum to “Citations, family size,
opposition and the value of patent rights” Research Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, March 2004, Pages
363‐364 (noting that patents tested by opposition systems have greater value); Tahir Amin et al.,
Expert Review of Drug Patent Applications: Improving Health in the Developing World, 28:5 Health
77

22

Public Interest Analysis
Memorandum) as in the interest of patent offices.82 The U.S. position and its
reasoning was promptly criticized by public health advocates as removing an
important tool for “preventing patent applicants from gaining patent monopolies
based on weak for erroneous information, for improving the quality and efficiency
of patent office examinations, and for safeguarding access to medicines.”83
The U.S. TPP proposal would require change in Australia’s law, which already
includes a pre‐grant opposition system.84 As in other areas of the TPP, the clearest
target of the proposal may be India. Adopting this proposal would prevent the
countries of the TPP from adopting the kind of pre‐grant opposition processes that
India has found useful.85
D. Art. 8.9 – Unlimited Amendments to Patent Applications
Whereas Art. 8.7 makes it harder to challenge and revoke patent rights, art. 8.9
makes it much easier to successfully apply for them. Art. 8.9 forces countries to
allow patent applicants to make multiple amendments to their patent claims prior
to approval on the merits. TRIPS does not require Members to allow amendment of
patent applications. KORUS Art. 18.8.8 includes a TRIPS‐plus requirement to allow
applicants at least one opportunity to make amendments, corrections, and
observations in connection with their applications. The US TPP proposal would

Affairs, 948, 951‐52 (Aug. 25, 2009), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/w948.full.pdf+html (arguing that pre=grant
opposition systems lead to efficiency gains without causing problems of abuse of the system or rising
costs of delay).
82
See Pre-Grant Opposition, PUBLIC CITIZEN, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Leaked‐US‐TPPA‐paper‐on‐eliminating‐pre‐grant‐
opposition.pdf. (“A lengthy or onerous pre‐grant patent opposition system place undue burdens on
patent applicants and create additional costs to patent offices, thereby causing uncertainty and
deterring innovators and enterprises that would otherwise bring innovative products and services to
TPP partners.”).
83 Public Citizen, Health GAP, IMAK & Third World Network, Briefing Memo: Analysis of the Leaked
U.S. Paper on Eliminating Patent PreGrant Opposition, PUBLIC CITIZEN (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/analysis‐of‐leaked‐US‐paper‐on‐eliminating‐pregrant‐
opposition.pdf.; K.M. Gopakumar & Sanya R. Smith, IPR Provisions in FTAs: Implications for Access to
Medicines, in INTELLECTUAL PROP. & ACCESS TO MED: PAPERS & PERSPECTIVES, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 141, 144
(2010) (criticizing the elimination of pre‐grant opposition in U.S. FTAs).
84 Public Citizen TPP‐Australian Law Comparison (commenting that the TPP proposal would
proscribe the “pre‐grant opposition [process] in Australia [which] improves patent quality with
minimal interference to well‐drafted patent applications.”).
85 See Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst With TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 INDIAN
J.L. & TECH. 15, 26; Peter Drahos, The Jewel in the Crown: India’s Patent Office and PatentBased
Innovation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY REFORM 80, 95 (noting 150 pre‐grant oppositions filed by
Indian generic industry since 2005).
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make the number of amendments unlimited.
The interests of many patent offices will be best served by maximizing pre‐grant
oppositions and minimizing opportunities to amend patent claims after they are
filed. In such a system, companies have incentives to only file their strongest claims,
leading to a lower volume of weak applications and stronger overall patent value.86
Under the U.S. TPP proposal, applicants have more opportunities to game the
system in their favor and can demand the elongation of processes. They can, for
example, respond to a challenge or weakness in their application by adding entirely
new claims. They will lack an incentive to make all possible claims in an initial
completed application.87 Patent applicants will be rushed to file incomplete
applications to gain priority dates over other potential inventors, and will not be
penalized for filing incomplete or imperfect claims only to correct them after.
E. Art. 8.10 and Art. 8.11– Minimize Required Disclosure
TPP Arts. 8.10 and 8.11 reduce flexibility that countries have under TRIPS to
design domestic patent disclosure standards. TPP Art. 8.10 and 8.11 require that a
disclosure be considered sufficient if it “allows the invention to be made and used by
a person skilled in the art, without undue experimentation.”88 This provision may
impede flexibility in implementing TRIPS Art. 29.1’s permission for a disclosure
standard requiring disclosure of the best mode for carrying out the invention. In
addition, there could be other disclosure requirements of interest to TPP members,
including “information concerning the applicant’s foreign applications and grants.”89
A country might also require, for example, that the description be sufficient to allow
a person skilled in the art to be able to apply the technology in the country of the
application. Or a country might want to condition approval of the application on
disclosure of use of any traditional knowledge or genetic resources in order to

Cf. Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M Scherer, Katrin Vopel Erratum to “Citations, family size,
opposition and the value of patent rights” Research Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, March 2004, Pages
363‐364 (finding that patents which are upheld in opposition procedures are particularly valuable).
87 A similar problem occurs as a result of TPP‐2 Art. 9(8)(a), which makes the access window toll
upon “commencement,” rather than completion, of the marketing approval process.
88 TPP Art. 8.10. Without any TRIPS counterpart, TPP Art. 8.11 specifies that “Each Party shall
provide that a claimed invention is sufficiently supported by its disclosure if the disclosure
reasonably conveys to a person skilled in the art that the applicant was in possession of the claimed
invention as of the filing date.” Cf. KORUS Art. 18.8.10(a) (going further than TPP by requiring that a
claim invention is sufficiently supported by its disclosure “if the disclosure allows a person skilled in
the art to extend the teaching therein to the entire scope of the claim, thereby showing that the
applicant does not claim subject matter which the applicant had not recognized and described or
possessed on the filling date.”).
89 TRIPS, art. 29.2
86

24

Public Interest Analysis
facilitate access and benefit sharing.90 Finally, a country might require disclosure of
the generic name of a pharmaceutical product that incorporates the subject matter
of the patent application to ease patent searches on medicines.
F. Art. 8.12 – Industrial Applicability/Utility
TPP Art. 8.12 imposes a weak, U.S.‐centric definition of “industrial applicability”
on TPP members. TRIPS Art. 27.1 fn. 5 permits Members to define “industrial
application” to be synonymous with the term “useful,” and does not impose any
other definition on the term. This was included to permit the U.S. to continue to
implement its own standard of a very lax standard.91 TPP Art. 8.12 goes further,
however, in exporting the lax U.S. standard, requiring that a claimed invention be
considered industrially applicable “if it has a specific, substantial, and credible
utility.”92 This weaker standard, based on U.S. law, could be used by firms to press
for the patenting of “useful” ideas such as diagnostic, surgical, and therapeutic
methods, new uses of known medicines, business methods, and research tools – the
extension of patents to which in the U.S. is the subject of frequent academic critique.
This provision appears to be designed to foreclose stricter “industrial applicability”
standards that in some jurisdictions require a showing that the invention will result
in an actual industrial product.93

V.

PATENT AND DATA‐RELATED RIGHTS

A. TPP‐2 Art. 8.6 ‐ Lengthening Patent Term to Compensate for Delays
TPP‐2 Art. 8.6 would require TPP members to grant extensions of patent terms
beyond the TRIPS 20‐year minimum patent term to compensate both for delays in
patenting and in granting marketing approval. Patent term extensions delay the
introduction of generic products into a market, maintaining monopoly protections
and higher prices during the extension.
TRIPS Art. 33 requires a patent term of twenty years. TRIPS does not require
extensions beyond the 20‐year life of a patent for delays in granting a patent or
See Disclosure Requirements: Ensuring mutual supportiveness between the WTO TRIPS
Agreement and the CBD. http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Disclosure_req_book.pdf;
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/Ch4final.pdf.
91 See PUBLIC CITIZEN & HEALTH GAP (commenting that the “U.S. patentability standard of specific,
substantial and credible utility is more lenient than the industrial applicability standard used by
Vietnam and many other countries.”); Public Citizen TPP‐Malaysian Law Comparison (pointing out
that TPP Art. 8.12 seeks to “impose the U.S. patentability test . . . [which is] broad enough to cover
inventions without true industrial application.”).
92 The language is similar to KORUS Art. 18.8.10(b).
93 See UNCTAD‐ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICE
GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 361 (2005).
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marketing approval. The 20‐year standard was developed in recognition of the
known delays encountered through the examination process.
Mandatory patent term extensions have been a highly controversial aspect of the
U.S. post‐TRIPS trade agenda on pharmaceutical policy.94 As part of the May 10th
2007 New Trade Deal, implemented in the Peru FTA, patent term extensions for any
reason were made optional rather than mandatory. The Peru FTA allowed both
countries to exempt pharmaceutical products from patent extension requirements.
The U.S. TPP‐2 proposal would require patent extensions for unreasonable delays in
product registration or issuance of a patent without the May 10 th exemption,
thereby punishing patients for bureaucratic delays.
The TPP proposal is KORUS‐plus. TPP‐2 Art. 8.6 requires an increase in patent
terms beyond 20 years to compensate for “unreasonable” delay in the granting of a
patent, defined as a delay of more than four years from the date of filing of the
application – the same as KORUS – or two years after a request for examination –
one year shorter than KORUS.95 This requirement is broadly consistent with U.S.
law, which has a three‐year window.96 In addition, TPP‐2 Art. 8.6 requires
additional term extensions for regulatory delays in approving marketing of
pharmaceutical products, including for patents that merely cover a new method of
making or using a pharmaceutical product. As in other areas of TPP, although patent
term extensions are mandatory, the limitation of patent term extensions, e.g. to a
maximum of no more than 5 years and no more than one extension (both attributes
of current U.S. law97) are permissive.98
The so‐called Access Window features of TPP‐2 Art. 8.6(e) is subject to Art.
9.2(b) or (d), which will be discussed further below.
The predictable impact of patent term extensions is to lengthen monopolies and
thereby raise the medicines bill for member countries. Moreover, the time pressure
of early patent examination and early marketing approval might result in over‐
extended patent offices granting invalid patents and in harried, drug regulatory
registering unsafe or inefficacious medicines. This is especially a problem as the
See UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM – MINORITY
STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (June 2005).
95 KORUS Art. 18.8.6.
96 If the USPTO fails to issue a patent within three years from the actual U.S. filing date, it must
extend the patent term one day for each day beyond the three‐year period. 35 U.S.C. §154(b)(1)(B).
97 See 35 U.S.C. §156. The period of restoration extends from the original expiration date of the
patent; however, the total patent term, with restoration, following FDA market approval may not
exceed fourteen years. §156(c)(3).
98 TPP‐2 Art. 8.6(d) (permitting regulatory‐delay patent term extensions to be limited to a single
adjustment for each new pharmaceutical product and for the basis of the adjustment to be the first
marketing approval granted to a new pharmaceutical product).
94
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international volume of pharmaceutical patent applications and marketing approval
applications grows overwhelming countries, especially developing countries, with
weak regulatory capacity.
B. TPP‐2 Art. 9.2 ‐ Expanded Data Exclusivity
TPP‐2 Art. 9.2 requires data exclusivity, a very strict form of data protection that
is in excess of TRIPS requirements and negates the pro‐development flexibilities of
the 2007 New Trade Deal.99 The U.S. proposal on data exclusivity is a “TRIPS‐plus
provision that restricts access to essential clinical trial data . . . [and] prevent[s]
generic manufacturers from using existing clinical research to gain regulatory
approval of their medicines, forcing them to perform duplicate clinical trials or wait
for the ‘data monopoly’ period to end.”100 In essence, data exclusivity prevents a
drug regulatory agency from referencing regulatory data submitted by a prior
registrant and from relying on the fact of prior registration anywhere else.
Introducing data exclusivity threatens the registration of generic versions of
medicines and creates a system conducive to creating monopolies.
Data exclusivity is not required by TRIPS. In fact, during the negotiation of TRIPS
Art. 39.3, the U.S. proposal that TRIPS incorporate a data exclusivity standard was
flatly rejected by the negotiating parties.101 TRIPS Art. 39.3 merely requires
protection only against the “unfair commercial use” of “undisclosed” data required
to be submitted for marketing approval of a “new chemical entity.”102 TPP‐2 Art.
9.2(a) and (b), patterned on KORUS Art. 18.9.1, abandons the inherent flexibilities in
TRIPS Art. 39.3 and imposes U.S.‐style data monopolies.
•

Rather than banning only the unfair commercial use of information,
which could allow for registration authorities to use registration‐related

MSF TPP Issue Brief at 5 (explaining that data protection or data exclusivity is a “TRIPS‐plus
provision that restricts access to essential clinical trial data . . . [and] prevent[s] generic
manufacturers from using existing clinical research to gain regulatory approval of their medicines,
forcing them to perform duplicate clinical trials or wait for the ‘data monopoly’ period to end.”
Introducing provisions for data protection in conjunction with a provision for patent term extension
greatly threaten the registration of generic versions of medicines and creates a system conducive to
creating monopolies).
100 MSF Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, TPP ISSUE BRIEF (September 2011), available
at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/2011/MSF‐TPP‐Issue‐Brief.pdf.
101 Carlos Correa and Abdulqawi Yusuf , Intellectual Property and International Trade, The TRIPs
Agreement, Kluwer Law International, (London‐Cambridge 1998); Daniel Gervais, TRIPS Agreement 
Drafting History and Analysis, (Sweet & Maxwell. 1998) pp. 182‐183.
102 See Carlos Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under
Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
(2006) (explaining that, under TRIPS, the reliance on prior reviewed data by a regulation authority to
approve a generic version of the same drug need not be considered a “commercial use” of the data); Brook
K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity And Patent/Registration Linkage,
34 AM. J. LAW & MEDICINE 303-44(2008).
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information to grant marketing approval of generic drugs,103 the TPP‐2
data exclusivity proposal bans reference and reliance registration of any
new product “based on” safety and efficacy information submitted to it or
to another country for an originator product.104
•

The TPP‐2 data exclusivity provision abandons the TRIPS provision that
protection only be required for “undisclosed” information and now
requires protection for all data whether previously disclosed or not. Often
clinical trial data is made public in various ways, including by funders,
registration authorities, and academic publication. Thus, TPP‐2 would
require granting of exclusive rights for information that is already in the
public domain and is in no sense a trade secret.

•

The TPP‐2 data exclusivity proposal also abandons the TRIPS rule that
requires protection only for “new chemical entities” and instead requires
protection of new pharmaceutical product that might incorporate existing
chemical entities.

•

In addition, TPP‐2 Art. 9.2(c) and (d) both require an additional three‐
year term of exclusivity for data submitted for approval of a new use or
form of an approved chemical entity.105 Moreover, as in U.S. law, there
can be successive three‐year data exclusivity extensions, meaning that
data exclusivity, like patents, can be ever‐greened.

The U.S. TPP‐2 proposal abandons data‐exclusivity flexibilities adopted in the
2007 New Trade Policy and thereafter granted Peru and Colombia in their FTAs
with the U.S. Like TRIPS Art. 39.3, the Peru and Colombia FTAs’ data exclusivity
provision is limited to new chemical entities. Contrary to U.S. law imposing strict
exclusivity periods and the TPP‐2 draft which requires “at least” five years of
exclusivity, the Peru and Columbia FTAs required data exclusivity for an undefined
“reasonable period.” The Peru and Colombia FTAs also included a use‐or‐lose it
restriction on data exclusivity whereby if a Party relies on marketing approval
granted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and if the Party grants approval
within six months of an application for marketing approval, the five‐year data

See Carlos Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products under
Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2006)
(explaining that, under TRIPS, the reliance on prior reviewed data by a regulation authority to
approve a generic version of the same drug need not be considered a “commercial use” of the data).
104 See TPP‐2 Art. 9.2(b) (stipulating that the drug regulatory authority may neither reference
previously submitted clinical trial data nor rely on evidence that the product was previously
approved either domestically or in another territory).
105 See also KORUS Art. 18.9.2.
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exclusivity period begins when the drug was first approved in the U.S.106 Finally, the
Peru and Colombia data exclusivity provisions provided for an express public health
exception to data exclusivity allowing reference or reliance registration when either
a compulsory licensing had been issued on the underlying patent(s) or even when
there was no patent(s) if public health needs so required. All of these data
exclusivity flexibilities are missing from the U.S. TPP‐2 proposal.
Commentators are virtually unanimous in concluding that data exclusivity is not
required by TRIPS Art. 39.3. Moreover, commentators express alarm that the
adoption of data exclusivity would require a generic producer to reproduce clinical
trial evidence in order to obtain marketing approval during the period of exclusivity.
Not only would such evidence be duplicative, costly, and time‐consuming, its
collection would violate human subject protections in clinical trials, as trial
participants would be required to submit to double‐blind clinical trials even though
evidence of efficacy and safety had been previously established.
C. TPP‐2 Art. [X] and Art. 9.3 – Mere Reference to the Doha Declaration, Public
Health Protections
The U.S. proposal mentions the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health in TPP‐2 Article [X] and Article 9.3. But the provisions fail to protect
the core of the Doha Declaration’s object – ensuring that all WTO members remain
free to exercise “to the full” TRIPS flexibilities that promote access to affordable
medicines for all. Notably, the provisions fail to incorporate the public health
exceptions to data exclusivity and patent/registration linkage from the 2007 New
Trade Policy.
1.

TPP‐2 Art. [x].1

Article [X].1 starts with the now standard affirmance of the Parties' prior
commitment to the Doha Declaration. Although it is boilerplate to acknowledge a
unanimous WTO commitment made nearly ten years ago, and although
acknowledgement is superior to exclusion or rejection, the boilerplate does not
make up for an absence of specific clarifying commitments about how countries can
operationalize Doha to overcome the many TRIPS‐plus provisions in the TPP
proposal.
106

Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia, U.S.Colom., Art. 16.10.2(c), Nov. 22, 2006 [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text; Free Trade Agreement
between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru, U.S.-Peru, Art. 16.10.2(c), Apr. 12, 2006
[hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/peru-tpa/final-text. This early filing requirement applied only if Peru or Colombia granted
marketing approval based in whole or in part on evidence of marketing approval in the U.S.
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2.

TPP‐2 Art. [x].2

Article [X].2 articulates Doha‐related “understandings.” Subsection (a) states
that “The obligations of this Chapter do not and should not prevent a Party from
taking measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all, in
particular concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other
epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or national
emergency.”107 This statement has at least two problems.
First, it is important that any affirmation of the Doha Declaration not be limited
to certain infectious disease epidemics and to a narrow subset of public health
needs that can be classified as matters of extreme urgency or national
emergency. The burden of non‐communicable chronic diseases is escalating
throughout the world, particularly in low‐ and middle‐income countries where the
cost of many chronic disease medicines, including those for cancers, psychiatric
illnesses and other illnesses is too expensive for individual patients, insurers, and
governments.108 Likewise, many developing countries face a persistent crisis with
respect to neglected tropical diseases where newer, more expensive medicines
might again be priced at unaffordable levels.109 The U.S.’s intent to purposefully
exclude non‐infectious chronic disease can be inferred from its efforts at the UN
High Level Meeting on Non‐Communicable Diseases to ensure that they were not
described as an “epidemic” nor as an “emergency” and that no mention of the Doha
Declaration appeared in the meeting’s outcome.110
Second, the affirmation that the U.S. TPP proposals “do not” prevent a Party from
taking measures to promote access to medicines may set a dangerous precedent for
TPP‐2 Art. [X].2(a) (noting that subsection (a) ends with Doha‐consistent boilerplate that the
"[c]hapter can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of each Party's
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.").
108 See e.g. Felicia Marie Knaul, Julio Frenk & Lawrence Shulman for the Global Task Force on
Expanded Access to Cancer Care and Control in Developing Countries, CLOSING THE CANCER DIVIDE: A
BLUEPRINT TO EXPAND ACCESS IN LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES, Section 7 (2011), available at
http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/uploads/pdf/ccd_report_111027.pdf.; World Health Organization,
NON‐COMMUNICABLE DISEASES: COUNTRY PROFILES 2011, available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241502283_eng.pdf.
109 World Health Organization, WORKING TO OVERCOME THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF NEGLECTED TROPICAL
DISEASES,
UPDATE
2011,
available
at
http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/2010report/WHO_NTD_report_update_2011.pdf.
110 William New, Questions Arise over UN Policy on NonCommunicable Diseases and IP Rights, IP‐
WATCH (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.ip‐watch.org/weblog/2011/09/16/questions‐
arise‐over‐un‐policy‐on‐non‐communicable‐diseases‐and‐ip‐rights/. These efforts were ultimately
successful, though there were two references to countries’ need to use intellectual property
flexibilities to access NCD medicines. See, Political Declaration of the Highlevel Meeting of the
General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, A/66/L1 (Sept. 19‐20,
2011), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/ncdmeeting2011/.
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the interpretation of the Doha Declaration. As described throughout this note, there
are numerous TRIPS‐plus standards in the TPP proposal that will predictably lead to
higher prices and lower availability of pharmaceutical products, especially in
developing countries.111 Implicitly defining these standards as compliant with the
Doha Declaration significantly limits the express statement in the Declaration that
TRIPS flexibilities can and should be available “to the full.” Doha should be read to
prevent the proposal or adoption of any TRIPS‐plus measure that may negatively
impact public health and access to medicines for all.112 A better provision fully
embracing Doha would create an explicit and operational exception for any TPP
provision on the basis that the member country concludes that the provision would
impede access to affordable medicines or the promotion of public health objectives.
3.

TPP‐2 Art. [X].2(b)

Article. [X].2(b) appears as an attempt to narrow the interpretation of TRIPS and
Doha‐compliant compulsory licenses into the procedurally labyrinth contours of
what the U.S. calls the “TRIPS/Health solution.” The TRIPS/Health solution is a
current waiver and a proposal to amend the TRIPS agreement to allow
export/import of medicines produced under special compulsory licenses to a
country with little or no manufacturing capacity.113 The proposed TRIPS art. 31bis
Chief among them may be: (1) lowered patent standards, presumptions of valid patent status,
and express obligations to grant patents for new uses and new forms of existing products, (2)
elimination of rights of pre‐grant opposition, (3) extension of patent terms beyond the TRIPS
requirement of 20 years to compensate for delays in granting patents and/or in granting marketing
approval, (4) five‐year data exclusivity following the first registration of a new pharmaceutical
product with rights to evergreen data exclusivity for an additional three years whenever new clinical
trial data is submitted, (5) mandatory patent/registration linkage giving patent holders a right to
prevent registration of alleged patent infringing products no matter how weak the patent claim is, (6)
unconscionable restrictions on government price control and therapeutic formulary policies, and (7)
multiple TRIPS‐plus enforcement measures.
112 TRIPS flexibilities thus include, for example, the adoption of strict patentability criteria under
TRIPS Art. 27, the avoidance of patent extensions beyond 20 years in implementing TRIPS Art. 33,
the avoidance of data exclusivity in the implementation of TRIPS Art. 39.3, and the avoidance of any
other TRIPS‐plus protection or enforcement measure that will increase market power of brand name
pharmaceutical companies.
113 Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration required the development of a quick and expeditious
mechanism allowing export/import of medicines to countries that had insufficient pharmaceutical
capacity locally to either produce medicines that were not patented or those authorized pursuant to
a properly issued compulsory license or government use order. Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement
had created a major barrier for these non‐producing importers because it restricted the quantity of
medicines produced pursuant to a compulsory license that could be exported to other countries to
"non‐predominant" amounts, presumably less than 50% of output. Unfortunately, the TRIPS/Health
solution that was adopted on 30 August 2003 is painfully complex. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO
Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L
317 (2005).
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amendment on export licenses should not be called a “solution” to anything – it is
labyrinth and virtually unworkable.114 It has been used only once, as a trial run
between two countries that have not used it again. There is no evidence that the
proposed TRIPS amendment will in fact promote global access to medicines, a fact
articulated by Ecuador at the most recent TRIPS council meeting.115 Countries
should maintain flexibilities to explore other options for meeting the particular
challenges of supplying non‐producing countries, including: (1) export of unlimited
quantities through compulsory licenses issued on competition grounds (TRIPS Art.
31(k); (2) exporting non‐predominant quantities pursuant to an ordinary TRIPS Art.
31 license; or (3) export to non‐producing countries through an easy‐to‐use TRIPS
Art. 30 limited exception.
4.

TPP‐2 Art. 9.3

TPP‐2 Art. 9.3, which deals with “measures relating to certain regulated
products,” and more particularly with U.S. proposals for data exclusivity and patent‐
registration linkage, also contains boilerplate references to the Doha
Declaration.116 The 2007 New Trade Policy, which led to revisions in the U.S.‐Peru
and U.S.‐Colombia free trade agreements, provided express guidance on how to
operationalize a text‐based public health exception to data exclusivity and
patent/registration linkage which is lacking from the current proposal. Specifically,
TPP Art. 9.3 fails to provide for rights to override data exclusivity and
patent/registration linkage either (1) to ensure rights to obtain marketing approval
when a compulsory license or government use license is issued or (2) to have a
compulsory‐license‐like exception to data exclusivity and patent/registration
linkage even if no patent bar is in place.
D. TPP‐2 Art. 9.5 – Mandatory Adoption of Patent/Registration Linkage
TPP‐2 Art. 9.5 contains a TRIPS‐plus proposal on what is called
patent/registration linkage. Although patent/registration linkage is not mentioned
in TRIPS and is not required in many countries, including most TPP negotiating

114 Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines, Analysis of WTO Action Regarding
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 613‐715 (2004).
115 See TWN, Review of "Para 6" system, ACTA feature at TRIPS Council, SUNS #7252 (2 November
2011), available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2011/ipr.info.111101.htm
116 See TPP‐2 Art. 9.3 (reiterating that "a Party may take measures to protect public health in
accordance with" the Doha Declaration, any current waiver (including presumably the TRIPS/Health
solution) and any eventual amendment based on implementing the Doha Declaration (presumably
referring indirectly to proposed amended Art. 31bis).
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countries,117 it has become a common and contested feature of U.S. free trade
agreements.118 Linking marketing approval to patent status gives patent owners a
powerful and cost effective tool to block generic entry. Any company claiming a
patent on a drug may halt the regulatory approval of a competing product without
any private enforcement action and without a determination as to the validity of the
underlying patent claim. This provides strong incentives for the filing of numerous,
even if weak or invalid, patent claims which can then be used to halt marketing
approval of potential competitors through the linkage system. Generics will then be
required to wait until the completion of a patent challenge (for each claim) in order
to reach the market, which may take many years. The costs of litigation and delay
may be so high as to provide an effective deterrent to generic companies entering
marketing with claimed patents – even where underlying patents are patently
invalid.
TPP‐2 goes even further than KORUS in specifying linkage requirements. TPP‐2
proposes that its members be required to provide: (1) a transparent and effective
mechanism to identify patent(s) covering an approved pharmaceutical product or
its approved method of use; (2) notice to a patent holder of the identity of another
person who intends to market the same and "similar" products during the term of
the identified patent or patents; (3) automatic stays of marketing approval activity
for the follow‐on product sufficient to allow an opportunity to adjudicate disputes
concerning patent validity or infringement; (4) expeditious judicial or
administrative procedures to allow timely adjudication of patent disputes, including
rights to issue provisional orders; and (5) for the denial of registration for infringing
products for the duration of the patent. On the other hand, consistent with U.S. law,
where a challenged party successfully challenges the validity or applicability of the
patent, it is required to be provided with an effective reward, which might include a
period of marketing exclusivity.
Patent/registration linkage turns drug regulatory authorities into patent
policing agents who aid patent holders in the enforcement of their private rights.
Moreover the automatic stays can be abusive. In response to the experience of the
See PUBLIC CITIZEN & HEALTH GAP (explaining that “Vietnamese law contains no provision that
links the patent system to the drug marketing approval process” and that many U.S. FTAs require
patent linkage which “shifts burdens of early patent enforcement to drug regulatory authorities.”);
see also Public Citizen TPP‐Malaysian Law Comparison (noting that “Malaysian law contains no
provision that links the patent system to marketing approval process.”); cf. Public Citizen TPP‐
Australian Law Comparison (explaining that although “AUSFTA introduced patent linkage in
Australia, Australia sought to limit its effect through statutory measures imposing penalties for
linkage evergreening” and subsequently, the USTR attacked these safeguards and therefore, the TPP
proposal “raises a serious concern that the [U.S.] may seek to limit or eliminate Australian
safeguards.”).
118 See KORUS Art. 18.9.5.
117
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use of linkage to evergreen patents through the filing of subsequent (often invalid)
claims to halt generic entry, U.S. law now limits patent holders to one automatic stay
to litigate any patent claims.119 Furthermore, there are still concerns that strict
forms of patent/registration linkage might interfere with effective use of
compulsory licenses. This is because licensees could be prevented from marketing
their generic equivalents after receiving a license on some patent claims by virtue of
subsequent claims being filed on the same product.
E. TPP‐2 Arts. 9.4, 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8 – TEAM Access Window Mainly Benefits
Innovator Registration
Well before the new leak of TPP‐2, the U.S. released its Trade‐Enhancing Access
to Medicines proposal (TEAM Access Window).120 The memo stated that the Access
Window was “designed to deploy the tools of trade policy to promote trade in, and
reduce obstacles to, access to both innovative and generic medicines, while
supporting the innovation and intellectual property protection that is vital to
developing new medicines and achieving other medical breakthroughs.” The memo
immediately became the subject of criticism for both its obscuration of substance
and its non‐transparent process by public health advocates.121 Now that the actual
text of the Access Window has been leaked, it is clear that its main impact will be to
ease registration for innovators with no real benefit for access to generics.
As discussed above, the general rule under TPP‐2 is that members must grant
patent extension for regulatory delays, 5/3‐year data exclusivity, and
patent/registration linkage. These requirements will apply to the vast majority of
marketing requests where the Access Window does not apply either because a
country has not changed its law to utilize Access Window provisions (see discussion
below) or because the marketing‐approval applicant has chosen not to utilize the
Access Window mechanism.122
The U.S. Access Window provides countries with the option of having marketing
approval procedures that rely in whole or in part on the fact of marketing
approval/registration in another country.123 If countries have such a fast‐track,
21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2) and (5).
See TransPacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, USTR, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3059.
121 http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2011/10/22/leaked‐trans‐pacific‐fta‐texts‐reveal‐u‐
s‐undermining‐access‐to‐medicine/
122 TPP‐2 art. 9.8(b) confirms that “a Party may not refuse to grant approval of a new
pharmaceutical product on the basis of a failure of an applicant for marketing approval to satisfy the
[Access Window] requirements of subparagraphs 6(e) of Article 8 or paragraph 4 and 6 of this
Article.”
123 See TPP‐2 arts. 9.4, 9.6, 8‐6(e) (noting that countries are not required to create the TEAM
Access Window, but they "may" do so in a narrow subset of cases ‐ where the party "requires or
permits an applicant to obtain approval for marketing a new pharmaceutical product in its territory
by relying, in whole or in part, on the prior approval of the pharmaceutical product by the regulatory
119
120
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reliance mechanism, they can limit patent term extensions related to regulatory
delays (not patenting delays),124 data protection, and patent/registration linkage for
applicants who use the reliance mechanism within an unspecified number of years –
the “access window.”125 If the reliance registrant delays filing a reliance‐application
until after the access window, the applicant loses rights to these three, TRIPS‐plus,
registration‐related IP benefits.
It is important to remember that the applicant would always have the option to
apply for marketing approval by submitting a full registration dossier that does not
rely in whole or in part on the fact or prior registration elsewhere. The silver lining
for pharmaceutical companies, even where the Access Window does apply, is
contained in Article 9.8(a), which requires the TPP country to allow initiation of
marketing registration in that country based on any information available to the
applicant, including “evidence of prior approval of the product in another Party
[country].” This easy‐to–meet standard makes it easier to file early for marketing
approval, but it does not necessarily ensure quicker final approval of drugs. More
importantly, speedier registration will not necessarily result in lower prices –
generics will still have to wait until patent terms and/or data exclusivity periods
expire.
Pharmaceutical companies have long chaffed over the lack of harmonization of
drug regulatory authorities' marketing approval requirements, standards, and
processes. The multinational pharmaceutical industry would like a registration
process that is very like what is provided by the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty,
an easy‐to‐use, standardized mechanism to initiate marketing approval applications
before national drug regulatory authorities. Indeed, there is a separate annex on
pharmaceutical regulatory harmonization in the US TPP proposals.126 Article 9.8(a)
provides the industry with the easy‐to‐use, fast‐track mechanism it has desired.
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies can even choose which information and
format they want to submit as applicants do not have to submit complete dossiers in
order to cross the start‐line for the Access Window.127
authority in another county.").
124 See TPP‐2 art. 8.6(e) (applying Access Window restrictions only with respect to art. 8.6(c)
extensions – those caused by unreasonable delays in the marketing approval process).
125 See TPP‐2 FN 2 (claiming that the length of the TEAM Access Window should enhance
certainty, provide incentive for the diffusion of pharmaceutical products, respect commercial
consideration, and account for challenges faced by smaller or lesser experienced applicants or the
time needed to assess country‐specific safety and efficacy issues).
126 See Trans‐Pacific Partnership, U.S. Introduction to Proposed TBT Annexes on Medical Devices,
Pharmaceutical Products and Cosmetic Products [hereinafter TPP U.S. Intro to TBT Annexes],
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf_TransPacificTBTwMedicalAnnexes.pdf (extending
the industry’s intentions and interests); Trans‐Pacific Partnership, U.S. Textual Proposal for the TBT
Chapter: Annex on Phamaceutical Products, Annex IV [hereinafter TPP Annex IV], available at
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf_TransPacificTBTwMedicalAnnexes.pdf (noting that in paras. 8
and 9, the U.S. seeks TPP partners’ agreement to use the ICD Common Technical Document as the
standardized harmonized form to initiate marketing approval requests.)
127 TPP‐2 article 9‐8 (providing that “[w]here a party chooses to apply subparagraph 6(e) of
Article 8 and paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Article [Article 9], the following provisions shall apply: (a) a
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Based on having satisfied minimal Access‐Window information and timing
prerequisites, right‐holders will potentially be entitled to multi‐year patent‐term
extensions for marketing approval delays, to successive data exclusivity periods that
will run from the time final marketing approval (not from the time of the simplified
initiation of the registration request), and patent‐registration linkage ‐‐ all without
benefit of the flexibilities called for in the 2007 New Trade Deal.128
TPP‐2 Art. 9.7 contains another new‐to‐U.S. FTAs provision encouraging even
longer periods of data exclusivity. The provision states that parties would be
exempted from the three‐year data protection terms for submission of new clinical
information, automatic delays of marketing approval in their patent/registration
linkage mechanisms, and rewards for successful challenges to patent rights if they
adopt periods of data exclusivity for new pharmaceutical products for an undefined
duration (“Y”) in excess of five years. If pharmaceutical companies can get
substantially longer data exclusivity, especially if it contains mechanisms for
evergreening exclusivity such as that involving biologics, they won’t have to rely on
patent protections to obtain marketing monopolies. Data monopolies of sufficient
length will be superior to patents from the perspective of pharmaceutical firms
because data monopolies give the same or higher level of monopoly protection
without the need and expenses of proving that a product meets the relatively high
standards for patentability.

Party shall permit an applicant to commence the process of obtaining marketing approval by
providing the regulatory authority of the Party information supporting approval of the new
pharmaceutical product in the Party that is available to the person at the time the request is
made, such as evidence of the prior approval of the product in another Party. It is understood, that,
while a Party may impose reasonable additional requirements or deadlines as a condition of
authorizing the person to market to market the pharmaceutical product in its territory, satisfaction
of those additional requirements or deadlines or the granting of approval shall be recognized by the
Party as necessarily occurring after the commencement of the marketing approval process within the
meaning of subparagraph 6(e) of Article 8 or paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Article.”) (emphasis added).
128 The problem is not simply making a big deal out of very minor process, the Access Window
provisions are also likely to result in pressure from the US and Big Pharma for what is essentially a
harmonized global registration system, such as those proposed in the Proposed TBT Chapter Annex
on Pharmaceutical Products. We can now see that US is arguing with trade partners that they should
vicariously grant registration in their countries based on prior marketing approval by drug
regulators in the US, Europe, or Japan. If countries are tempted to adopt full‐scale reliance
registration, there is a risk that they will have reduced ability to assess medicines in light of the
particular patient risks and benefits in their country. Although reliance registration may have certain
advantages for countries with weak regulatory authorities and although lack of procedural
harmonization adversely impacts both innovator companies and generics, countries are being asked
to give up far too much TRIPS‐plus territory for a quick‐registration Access Window that doesn't
require fast completion and prosecution of registration applications and that results in greater and
longer monopoly protections that will inevitably lead to higher prices and reduced generic
competition.
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Admittedly, there is some potential benefit to countries that want to provide
inducements to pharmaceutical companies to bring their new medicines to market
more quickly. To the extent that differential registration standards and processes
have disincentivized innovators from quickly launching new products, simplification
might speed up market entry. Drug regulatory systems should be made more
transparent, efficient, and even harmonized, but only so long as high, country‐
specific standards for assuring quality, safety, and efficacy are maintained. The
desirability of earlier product introduction should have nothing to do with a tradeoff
involving greater IP protections that extend and strengthen drug company patent
and data‐related monopolies. The Access Window is promoted as benefitting TPP
parties, but it is clear that the true beneficiaries are innovator companies. 129

VI.

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO ENFORCEMENT

Art. 10.2 requires presumptions in civil and administrative proceedings that “the
person whose name is indicated in the usual manner as the author, producer,
performer, or publisher of the work, performance, or phonogram is the designated
right holder” and that “the copyright or related right subsists in such subject
matter.” Neither of these presumptions exist in current U.S. law.130

VII.

CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES

A. Art. 12.2 – Injunctions
TPP Art. 12.2 requires every party to provide for injunctive relief, similar to
ACTA Art. 8.1.131 However, unlike ACTA, TPP Art. 12.2 beneficially narrows the
The problem is not simply making a big deal out of very minor process, the Access Window
provisions are also likely to result in pressure from the US and Big Pharma for what is essentially a
harmonized global registration system, such as those proposed in the Proposed TBT Chapter Annex
on Pharmaceutical Products. We can now see that US is arguing with trade partners that they should
vicariously grant registration in their countries based on prior marketing approval by drug
regulators in the US, Europe, or Japan. If countries are tempted to adopt full‐scale reliance
registration, there is a risk that they will have reduced ability to assess medicines in light of the
particular patient risks and benefits in their country. Although reliance registration may have certain
advantages for countries with weak regulatory authorities and although lack of procedural
harmonization adversely impacts both innovator companies and generics, countries are being asked
to give up far too much TRIPS‐plus territory for a quick‐registration Access Window that doesn't
require fast completion and prosecution of registration applications and that results in greater and
longer monopoly protections that will inevitably lead to higher prices and reduced generic
competition.
130 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf (noting that
fulfillment of notice provisions in U.S. law “only affects a defendant’s claim of innocent
infringement”).
131
ACTA Art. 8.1 (noting that “[e]ach Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities have the authority
129
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scope of injunctions by providing that injunctive relief has to be consistent with the
safeguards contained in Art. 44 of TRIPS.132 Also unlike ACTA, the injunctive relief
does not extend to third parties. Overall, the injunction section in the TPP proposal
seems to be a watered down version of the ACTA standards. This provision on
injunctive relief was not included in KORUS, which did not require injunctions to
prevent the exportation of infringing goods.
B. Art. 12.3 – Damages
TPP Art. 12.3 mandates that determinations of damages for copyright
infringement and trademark counterfeiting exceed the amount judged to be
“adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered.” On top of such
compensatory damages, the TPP proposal mandates damages equal to “the profits of
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement.” In addition, the provision
would require that “judicial authorities shall consider, inter alia, the value of the
infringed good or service, measured by the suggested retail price or other legitimate
measure of value submitted by the right holder.” These provisions do not have a
clear analogue in U.S. law.133
A key problem with these compensation‐plus measures is that they ignore the
phenomenon of exclusionary pricing, particularly in developing countries. Imagine,
for example, the common case of a copyrighted music supplier that charges the

to issue an order against a party to desist from an infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party
or, where appropriate, to a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises
jurisdiction, to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right from
entering into the channels of commerce.”).
132
TRIPS Art. 44 (enumerating that “1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a
party to desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in
their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right,
immediately after customs clearance of such goods. Members are not obliged to accord such
authority in respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or
having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter would entail the infringement
of an intellectual property right. 2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided
that the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third parties
authorized by a government, without the authorization of the right holder are complied with,
Members may limit the remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in
accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall
apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and
adequate compensation shall be available.”).
133 Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf (contrasting the TPP
proposal with sec. 504(b) of the Copyright Act and the willing buyer, willing seller standard of Frank
Music Corp. v. MGM Inc.).
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same price in a poor country as in the U.S. – e.g. $17 for a music CD.134 What should
be the measure of damages for the infringing the copyright of that CD through the
making of illegal copies? A reasonable compensatory damage measure may be based
on the percentage of the high price market (those willing and able to pay $17) that
are taken away by infringement. But this measure – the true measure of harm to the
copyright owner who has chosen to excessively price a product – would be far lower
than the two measures suggested by TPP because very few people in poor countries
are willing or able to pay U.S.‐level prices for media or other protected goods.
Multiplying the number of copies made the “retail price” ($17 in our example)
would over‐compensate the rights holder for sales that would have never taken
place at that price.135
TPP members should retain their sovereign rights to develop measures of
damages appropriate for their own social and economic contexts. This is
particularly important in developing countries where the impact of excessive
pricing is likely to be most pronounced.136
There are some key differences in the TPP proposals and other IP chapters in
trade agreements.
•

Unlike ACTA Art. 9.1137 and TRIPS Art. 45(1), TPP Art. 12.3 does not
require the infringer to “knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know,
engage in infringing activity,” thus converting the liability standard to one

This experience is studies in some detail in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (SSRC 2011).
See PUBLIC CITIZEN & HEALTH GAP (noting that “the U.S. proposal [which] would require courts
to consider suggested retail price or other measure of value submitted by the right holder . . . strongly
favors the interests of the right holders” since the hypothetical suggested retail price “may turn out
to be inflated or otherwise inaccurate”); Public Citizen TPP‐Malaysian Law Comparison (commenting
that the TPP proposal “would lead to an unrealistic determination of damages, which would
empower rights holders in court settlements and discourage defendants from litigating cases” and
that “Malaysian courts can better balance the competing interests . . . by maintaining the
compensatory approach to damages, filtering claims and continuing to determine appropriate
calculations for damages case‐by‐case.”).
136 Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Michael Palmedo, An Economic Argument for Open Access to
Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 184 (2009).
137
ACTA Art. 9.1 (providing that “[e]ach Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities have the authority
to order the infringer who, knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing
activity to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has
suffered as a result of the infringement. In determining the amount of damages for infringement of
intellectual property rights, a Party’s judicial authorities shall have the authority to consider, inter
alia, any legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include lost profits, the
value of the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail
price.”).
134
135
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of strict liability.
•

Compared to KORUS, TPP Art. 12.3 uses “and” to require payment of both
compensatory damages and lost profits, while KORUS Art. 18.10.5
requires either of the two, but not both, using “or”.

•

There is also a rewritten definition in Art. 12.3 fn 17, of “exclusive
licensee,” stating that it shall “include” the exclusive licensee of any one of
exclusive rights encompassed in a given intellectual property right. It is
unclear why the definition is not bound more specifically.

C. Art. 12.4 – Pre‐Established Damages
TPP Art. 12.4 further mandates damages in excess of compensatory levels by
requiring a system of pre‐established damages “sufficiently high to constitute a
deterrent to future infringement.”138 In a standard that reaches beyond any
international intellectual property agreement signed by any country, TPP Art. 12.4
further provides that in patent infringement cases, the damages may be increased
up to three times the amount found or assessed.
U.S. law provides for statutory damages for copyright violations, but does not
require that such damages be sufficiently high to constitute a deterrent to future
infringements.139 Normally, civil law damages for violation of private rights,
including rights to contract and property, are to compensate, not deter. Deterrent‐
level penalties, by definition, create inefficient exchanges in the market, threatening
competition. The opposite of deterrent damages are liability rules that allow use of
protected matter in exchange for compensatory damages. Such standards promote
rather than retard competition.
Pre‐established, or “statutory,” damages for copyright infringement are not
recognized in every major copyright system, and there are increasing criticisms of
the very high statutory damages in current U.S. law.140 In ACTA, pre‐established
damages were not required. Parties were given the choice between pre‐established
damages, presumptions for determining the amount of damages, or “additional”

TPP Art. 12.4.
Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and US
Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf (citing Sec. 504(b) of
the U.S. Copyright Act).
140 See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) (explaining that the U.S. is “an outlier in the
global copyright community in giving plaintiffs in copyright cases the ability to elect, at any time before
final judgment.”).
138

139
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copyright damages.141
The proposed triple damages scheme for patent violations is extreme and
untested. U.S. law contains the possibility for treble damages for willful patent
infringement. But TPP’s standard does not confine its requirement to such cases.
This is an extremely dangerous provision that could award windfalls to patent
owners, thus encouraging strategic patent filings and litigation for rent seeking.
D. Art. 12.5—Attorney’s fees
TPP makes the payment of attorney’s fees by the losing party as the norm in civil
judicial proceedings. ACTA Art. 9.5 requires that for at least copyright and
trademark infringement, the prevailing party “where appropriate” may be awarded
payment of court costs or fees and appropriate attorney’s fees, “or any other
expenses as provided for under that Party’s law.” TPP Art. 12.5 makes awarding of
such fees the norm “except in exceptional circumstances,” and doesn’t leave
flexibility for parties to determine whether alternate expenses get paid instead of
attorney’s fees. TPP Art. 12.5 also applies court costs or fees to patent infringement
as well, and attorney’s fees in patent infringement “at least in exceptional
circumstances.”
E. Art. 12.7 – Remedies
TPP mandates a very pro‐enforcement regime of remedies against goods that
have been found to be pirated or counterfeit, which sets destruction of the goods as
the norm. TPP Arts. 12.7(a), (b), and (c) are respectively equivalent to ACTA Arts.
10.1142, 10.2143, and 20.2.144 TPP Art. 12.7(b) goes beyond TRIPS and ACTA by
removing the requirement that destroyed goods have been predominantly used in
manufacture or creation of infringing goods. The provision also goes beyond current
U.S. law by requiring that a broader array of “materials and implements” be

See ACTA Art. 9.3.
ACTA Art. 10.1 (providing that “[a]t least with respect to pirated copyright goods and
counterfeit trademark goods, each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings, at the right
holder’s request, its judicial authorities have the authority to order that such infringing goods be
destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances, without compensation of any sort.”).
143
ACTA Art. 10.2 (enumerating that “[e]ach Party shall further provide that its judicial
authorities have the authority to order that materials and implements, the predominant use of which
has been in the manufacture or creation of such infringing goods, be, without undue delay and
without compensation of any sort, destroyed or disposed of outside the channels of commerce in
such a manner as to minimize the risks of further infringements.”).
144
ACTA at Art. 20.2 (stating that “[i]n regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the simple removal
of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit
release of the goods into the channels of commerce.”).
141
142
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destroyed than is the case under sec. 503(b) of the Copyright Act.145
In regards to counterfeit trademarked goods, unlike ACTA Art. 20.2, TPP Art.
12.7(c) does not allow for the removal of the trademark and release of the goods
outside of the market in exceptional cases – e.g. as donations to public and charity
programs. This could have particularly troublesome impacts on access to medicines
– potentially requiring destruction of safe and effective medicines that could be used
elsewhere.
F. Art. 12.8 – Information Related to Infringement
TPP Art. 12.8 requires that judicial authorities have authority order to “the
infringer” to provide the rights holder with various information, including
“regarding any persons or entities involved in any aspect of the infringement and
regarding the means of production or distribution channel of such goods or services,
including the identification of third persons involved in the production and
distribution of the infringing goods or services.” Unlike ACTA, this proposal lacks
safeguards requiring that any divulging of information be without prejudice to
domestic laws governing privileges, the protection of confidential information
sources or the processing of personal data.146 Furthermore, TPP does not require
that access to such information to be conditional “upon a justified request of the
right holder.” Concerns have been raised that the provision is not consistent with
evidentiary privileges in U.S. law, including state law privileges and the Federal
Rules of Evidence.147
G. Art. 12.9 – Additional Punishments
TPP Art. 12.9 goes beyond the purview of intellectual property rights

See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
146
ACTA Art. 11 (requiring that “[w]ithout prejudice to its law governing privilege, the protection
of confidentiality of information sources, or the processing of personal data, each Party shall provide
that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its
judicial authorities have the authority, upon a justified request of the right holder, to order the
infringer or, in the alternative, the alleged infringer, to provide to the right holder or to the judicial
authorities, at least for the purpose of collecting evidence, relevant information as provided for in its
applicable laws and regulations that the infringer or alleged infringer possesses or controls. Such
information may include information regarding any person involved in any aspect of the
infringement or alleged infringement and regarding the means of production or the channels of
distribution of the infringing or allegedly infringing goods or services, including the identification of
third persons alleged to be involved in the production and distribution of such goods or services and
of their channels of distribution.”).
147 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
145
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enforcement and reaches into the subject matter of contempt of court. Mimicking
KORUS Art. 18.10.11, TPP Art. 12.9(a) allows fines and imprisonment as means of
punishing those who fail to abide by valid orders issued by judicial authorities.
Additionally, 12.9(b) allows sanctions against “counsel, experts, or other persons
subject to the court’s jurisdiction” for violating “judicial orders regarding the
protection of confidential information produced or exchanged in a proceeding.”148

VIII.

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

A. Art. 13.1 – Provisional Relief Inaudita Altera Parte
TPP increases requirements to grant injunctions inaudita altera parte, i.e.
without prior hearing of the other side (also known as ex parte). TPP Art. 13.1
requires that such requests generally be processed by judicial authorities within ten
days. Unlike ACTA Art. 12.2149 and KORUS Art. 18.10.17,150 TPP does not require a
showing that “delay is likely to cause irreparable harm” or “a demonstrable risk of
evidence being destroyed” to adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte.
U.S. law does not contain any requirement that preliminary injunction requests
be granted within 10 days. Nor does the TPP proposal export the standards in U.S.
law that make preliminary injunctions, and especially ex parte preliminary
injunctions, difficult to obtain s a matter of course.151

IX.

SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO BORDER ENFORCEMENT

A. Art. 14.4 – Ex Officio Authority
Similar to ACTA Art. 16, and in excess of TRIPS, the TPP proposal grants ex officio
authority to customs officials to seize goods “suspected of being counterfeit or
confusingly similar trademark goods, or pirated copyright goods.”152 Such ex officio
authority extends to imported, exported, and in‐transit merchandise.

TPP Art. 12.9(b).
Id. at Art. 12.2 (mandating that “[e]ach Party shall provide that its judicial authorities have the
authority to adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate, in particular where
any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is a demonstrable
risk of evidence being destroyed. In proceedings conducted inaudita altera parte, each Party shall
provide its judicial authorities with the authority to act expeditiously on requests for provisional
measures and to make a decision without undue delay.”).
150
KORUS Art. 18.10.17 (requiring that “[e]ach Party shall act on requests for provisional
measures inaudita altera parte expeditiously”).
151 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
152
Id.
148
149
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The standard for a seizure being based on mere suspicion of being “confusingly
similar” is an extraordinarily low threshold for blocking the free trade of goods.
Nearly every generic medicine or generic version of a trademarked good (e.g. the
supermarket brand) is likely to have a label that could be suspected of being
confusingly similar to the originator, even thought the label does not in fact violate
any trademark right.153
Although TPP excludes patents from the purview of the border measures
provisions, this fails to assuage the concerns over its effects on access to
medicines.154 In 2009, a shipment of generic medicine amoxicillin, which is the INN
name required to be on the label, was seized in‐transit by German customs officials
due to the suspicion that it was confusingly similar to trademarked brand name
drug called “Amoxil.”155 As a result, the cargo was detained for weeks until it was
determined that there was no trademark infringement.
B. FN 20 – Definitions of Counterfeit Trademark Goods & Pirated Copyright Goods
Unlike ACTA, TPP’s definitions of counterfeit trademark goods and pirated
copyright goods provide a safeguard against application of the law of in‐transit
countries. TPP’s definition of counterfeit trademark goods concern the infringement
of the “rights of the owner of the trademark in question under law of the country of
importation” while ACTA’s definition concerns the rights of the owner under the law
of the country in which the procedures are invoked.156 Similarly, TPP’s definition of
pirated copyright goods concerns infringement of a copyright under the law of the
country of importation while ACTA’s definition concerns the law of the country in
which the procedures are invoked.157

See PIJIP, Counterfeit vs. Confusingly Similar Products,
www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/pdf05072010
154 See Public Citizen TPP‐Malaysian Law Comparison (explaining that the U.S. TPP proposal
would broader then scope of ex officio authority to cover civil trademark infringement cases and
therefore, it will contribute to the risk of “wrongly detaining generic medicines, which may usefully
communicate their bioequivalence to consumers through similar packaging.”).
155
Christian Wagner‐Ahlfs, Seizure of Indian generic amoxicillin in Frankfurt, ESSENTIALDRUGS.ORG,
available at http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200906/msg00014.php.
156
ACTA Art. 5(d) (defining that “counterfeit trademark goods means any goods, including
packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly
registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from
such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question
under the law of the country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter II (Legal Framework for
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are Invoked.”).
157
Id. at Art. 5(k) (stating that “pirated copyright goods means any goods which are copies
made without the consent of the right holder or person duly authorized by the right holder in the
country of production and which are made directly or indirectly from an article where the making of
153
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C. Art. 14.6 – Remedies
TPP mandates a pro‐enforcement border enforcement regime, which sets
destruction of the goods as the norm. TPP Art. 14.6 is equivalent to ACTA Arts. 20.1
and 20.2.158 Although both TPP and ACTA provide for an exception to destruction of
the infringing goods as a form of remedy, TPP does not allow for the option of
disposal of such goods outside the channels of commerce.
D. Art. 14.8 – Small Consignments
This provision resembles ACTA’s restriction of the application of the TRIPS
provision allowing “de minimis” shipments of goods to be exempted from border
search and seizure provisions. TPP Art. 14.8 is essentially identical to ACTA Art.
14,159 which eliminates the TRIPS Art. 60 exception for small quantities of goods of a
sent in small consignments.

X.

CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT – OFFENCES

A. Art. 15.1 – Offenses
TPP Art. 15.1 would expand internationally required criminalization of copyright
infringement to include “infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of
financial gain.”
TRIPS only requires criminalization of counterfeiting or copyright piracy is
“willful” and “on a commercial scale”.160 In the U.S.‐China case, the WTO affirmed
that countries may implement their own definition of “commercial scale,” including
both qualitative (e.g. for profit) and quantitative measures for the term. TPP Art.
15.1 shifts the potential focus to individual end‐users by defining “commercial scale”

that copy would have constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of
the country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter II (Legal Framework for Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights) are invoked.”).
158
Id. at Arts. 20.1, 20.2 (providing that “[e]ach Party shall provide that its competent authorities
have the authority to order the destruction of goods following a determination referred to in Article
19 (Determination as to Infringement) that the goods are infringing. In cases where such goods are
not destroyed, each Party shall ensure that, except in exceptional circumstances, such goods are
disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm to the right
holder. 2. In regard to counterfeit trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully
affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to permit release of the goods into the
channels of commerce.”).
159
Id. at Art. 14 (enumerating that “1. Each Party shall include in the application of this Section
goods of a commercial nature sent in small consignments. 2. A Party may exclude from the
application of this Section small quantities of goods of a non‐commercial nature contained in
travellers’ personal luggage.”).
160 TRIPS Art. 61.
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as including (a) “significant willful copyright or related rights infringements with no
direct or indirect motivation of financial gain,” and (b) willful infringements for
purposes of “private financial gain.” Footnote 24 further defines “private financial
gain” to include the mere “receipt or expectation of anything of value.” Under these
definitions, it appears that any knowing receipt of copyright infringing material on
the internet or otherwise could be defined as a violation of criminal law.
This provision does not track the details of current U.S. domestic law. U.S. law
does not contain this definition of “private financial gain.”161 And U.S. law contains
what might be seen as a floor on the term “significant,” limiting criminal
infringement to willful infringement of at least $1,000 worth of material in a 180‐
day period.162
Normally, the responsibility for enforcing IP infringements lies with the right
holder. By making the infringement criminal, the duty, cost and decision on whether
to enforce the right shift to the state. The TPP proposal would greatly expand the
amount of infringement activity subject to state enforcement. In addition to
resource concerns, this expansion of criminal liability raises civil liberty concerns
about state selection and enforcement of law infringement that is likely to be
ubiquitous in many countries.163
The provision conflicts with Art. 17.11.22 of the U.S.‐Chile free trade agreement.
That agreement criminalizes willful infringement for “commercial advantage or
financial gain,” rather than “private” financial gain, and contains a footnote 33,
explaining that “evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by
itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement.”
B. Art. 15.2 – Offenses
TPP Art. 15.2 expands criminal liability for acts “even absent willful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy.” The proposed extension of
criminal liability would include any “knowing trafficking in” labels or packaging “to
which a counterfeit trademark has been applied” or “counterfeit or illicit labels”
have been affixed to (in the case of specific products). These are new criminal
provisions that extend beyond TRIPS and ACTA.164 Unlike ACTA, TPP does not
17 U.S.C. § 506.
See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
163 See New York Times, Russia Uses Microsoft to Suppress Dissent, (Sept 11, 2010).
164
ACTA Art. 23.2 (requiring that “[e]ach Party shall provide for criminal procedures and
penalties to be applied in cases of willful importation and domestic use, in the course of trade and on
a commercial scale, of labels or packaging: (a) to which a mark has been applied without
authorization which is identical to, or cannot be distinguished from, a trademark registered in its
territory; and (b) which are intended to be used in the course of trade on goods or in relation to
services which are identical to goods or services for which such trademark is registered.”).
161
162
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require the use of the “confusing” label “on goods or in relation to services which are
identical to goods or services for which such trademark is registered.”
C. Art. 15.4—Offenses
TPP Art. 15.4 criminalizes aiding and abetting infringement. This is likely to be
meant for online intermediaries, as discussed further in XII, below.

XI.

CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

A. Art. 15.5(a) – Penalties
TPP Art. 15.5(a) mandates that criminal penalties follow guidelines that are not
included in present U.S. law. The provision, modeled on KORUS and ACTA,165 would
require that criminal penalties include “sentences of imprisonment as well as
monetary fines sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future infringements,
consistent with a policy of removing the infringer’s monetary incentive.” The
provision further requires “policies or guidelines that encourage judicial authorities
to impose those penalties at levels sufficient to provide a deterrent to future
infringements.” Neither of these standards are reflected in current U.S. sentencing
guidelines for copyright infringement.166
Both TPP and ACTA prescribe both “imprisonment and monetary fines
sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future” infringements. Note, however, that
TPP also adds that such penalties should be “consistent with a policy of removing
the infringer's monetary incentive.” TPP omits ACTA's safeguard that such penalties
shall be consistent with “the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding
gravity.” Furthermore, TPP requires party members to establish policies or
guidelines to “encourage judicial authorities to [actually] impose those penalties.”
TRIPS Art. 61 requires either monetary penalties or imprisonment, but not both.
B. Arts. 15.5(b), Seizures
TPP Art. 15.5(b), modeled on ACTA Art. 25.1,167 requires that judicial authorities
See KORUS Art. 18.10.27(a) (same); see also ACTA Art. 24 (stating that “[f]or offences specified
in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of Article 23 (Criminal Offences), each Party shall provide penalties that
include imprisonment as well as monetary fines sufficiently high to provide a deterrent to future acts
of infringement, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding
gravity.”)
166 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
167
ACTA Art. 25.1 (providing that parties “shall provide that its competent authorities have the
authority to order the seizure of suspected counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods,
any related materials and implements used in the commission of the alleged offence, documentary
evidence relevant to the alleged offence, and the assets derived from, or obtained directly or
165

47

TPP Intellectual Property Chapter
have the authority to order the seizure of “suspected” counterfeit or pirated goods
and implements. The TPP proposal adds that “items that are subject to seizure
pursuant to any such judicial order need not be individually identified so long as
they fall within general categories specified in the order.”
The duty to not require individual identification of property seized by
government officials may implicate constitutional and human rights protections.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that search and seizure
warrants “particularly” describe places to be searched and items to be seized.168
Similar guarantees against arbitrary searches and seizures of property may be
implicated in other TPP countries.
C. 15.5(d)(i) – Seizure, Forfeiture, and Destruction
TPP Art. 15.5(d)(i) would require the forfeiture and destruction of all counterfeit
or pirated goods. This provision is similar to similar to ACTA Art. 25.3,169 except that
ACTA requires the forfeiture OR destruction of such goods. While both TPP and
ACTA allow for an exception, TPP does not adopt the ACTA exception that allows
goods to be “disposed of outside the channels of commerce” rather than destroyed.
The lack of this exception may prevent, for example, the donation of the infringing
goods to charity.

XII.

SPECIAL MEASURES RELATING TO ENFORCEMENT IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT

A. Art. 16.3 – Internet Service Provider Liability
TPP contains two sets of standards that encourage internet service providers to
police the content of the users of their networks.
First, Art. 16.3(a) requires parties to provide “legal incentives for service
providers to cooperate with copyright owners in deterring the unauthorized storage
and transmission of copyrighted materials.” ACTA requires only that governments

indirectly through, the alleged infringing activity.”).
168 See Jodie Griffin, Inconsistencies Between the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and
US Law, Public Knowledge, www.publicknowledge.org/files/TPP%20Analysis.pdf
169
ACTA Art. 25.3 (“[w]ith respect to the offences specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article
23 (Criminal Offences) for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that Party shall
provide that its competent authorities have the authority to order the forfeiture or destruction of all
counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods. In cases where counterfeit trademark
goods and pirated copyright goods are not destroyed, the competent authorities shall ensure that,
except in exceptional circumstances, such goods shall be disposed of outside the channels of
commerce in such a manner as to avoid causing any harm to the right holder. Each Party shall ensure
that the forfeiture or destruction of such goods shall occur without compensation of any sort to the
infringer.”).
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“endeavor to promote cooperative efforts within the business community.”170
Providing legal incentives for ISPs to police the internet is a complex task for which
negotiation of standards in secretive international processes is completely
inappropriate. Intermediaries’ interests are not perfectly aligned with user
interests. Providing legal incentives for intermediaries to police networks may lead
to the censoring of content, including legitimate content, choking innovative
technology built on their platforms, surveillance of users, and threats to privacy and
freedom of expression.171 The kind of private ordering of copyright enforcement
represented by the TPP text has been a method of choice in the U.S., as evidenced by
a recent Memorandum of Understanding between intermediaries and content‐
owners, encouraged by the U.S. Copyright Czar.172 Language about encouraging such
cooperation should be viewed in light of these developments, which leave
businesses unaccountable to users, and users without normal expectations of due
process protected through court proceedings.
Second, the TPP proposal introduces a series of liability safeguards for ISPs, and
in so doing may promote the extension of secondary liability to ISPs. Intermediary
liability is not universally recognized. USTR has recognized that creating limitations
on liability encourages countries to adopt intermediary liability in the first
instance.173
It can be argued that TPP Art. 16.3 mandates a system of ISP liability that “goes
beyond DMCA standards” and U.S. case law.174 For example, TPP Art. 16.3(b)(xi)
requires ISPs to identify Internet users suspected of infringement, where U.S. courts
have found that ISPs are not subject to identification subpoenas. TPP Art. 16.3(b)(xi)
lacks ACTA Art. 27.4’s requirements that (i) there be a sufficient claim of
infringement, (ii) the information be sought for the purpose of protecting or
enforcing a copyright, and (iii) the procedures shall be implemented in a manner
that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity. The TPP Art. 16.3(b)(vii)
also fails to include the DMCA’s second privacy provision, that intermediaries may
Compare TPP Art. 16.3(a) with ACTA Art. 27.3.
Margot Kaminski, Plurilateral Trade Agreements Lack Protections for Users, Intermediaries,
http://infojustice.org/archives/5951
172 See David Kravets, U.S. Copyright Czar Cozied Up to Content Industry, E-Mails Show, WIRED
(Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/copyright-czar-cozies-up/#more31071. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online
Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 2010) (analyzing private ordering copyright enforcement and
graduated response).
173 See U.S.‐Peru FTA fn 28 (agreement language explicitly tempering that conclusion)
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1031.
174
The Complete Feb 10, 2011 text of the US proposal for the TPP IPR chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, [hereinafter KEI] available at http://keionline.org/node/1091.
170

171
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not access material contrary to law.175 ACTA Art. 27.2 similarly requires that any
system of digital enforcement be consistent with that Party’s law, and preserve
fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy. There
are other examples of discrepancies between the TPP and DMCA, as well.176
The TPP contains a U.S. side‐letter outlining notice‐and‐takedown, which was
rejected by Chile in signing its free trade agreement. That rejection allows
significantly more flexibility in implementation of any notice‐and‐takedown regime.
Finally, TPP contains language in Art. 15.4 criminalizing “aiding and abetting”
copyright infringement, that is likely intended to apply to online intermediaries. In
ACTA, the provision on aiding and abetting in Art. 23.4 was directly followed by a
provision requiring liability for legal persons—that is, companies—in Art. 23.5.
Criminal aiding and abetting has not appeared in other free trade agreements, and
when read in light of ACTA’s language on legal persons, may very well be intended
to apply to intermediaries. In the U.S., the Bureau of Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) has been seizing domain names based in part on this theory of
criminal liability.177 Criminal liability for intermediaries could threaten even those
intermediaries that comply with safe harbors, as criminal and civil systems are
distinct.

XIII.

TRANSPARENCY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR HEALTHCARE TECHNOLOGIES

Among the U.S. Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) proposals leaked during the
Peru round was a proposed chapter on “Transparency and Procedural Fairness for
Healthcare Technologies.”
A. X.1: Agreed Principles.
The agreed principles are verbatim restatements from the KORUS agreement. As
in KORUS, they understate the role and importance of promoting affordability
through pharmaceutical reimbursement policies. The provisions mainly discuss the
promotion of “access” and “availability” of pharmaceuticals. The concept of
affordability is mentioned only once. USTR’s recent white paper on TPP and
medicines also defines “access” without reference to affordability concerns. One of
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(2).
Margot Kaminski, Margot Kaminski: Plurilateral Trade Agreements Lack Protections for Users,
Intermediaries, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 27, 2011), http://infojustice.org/archives/5951, originally
posted on http://www.ip‐watch.org/weblog/2011/10/27/plurilateral‐trade‐agreements‐lack‐
protections‐for‐users‐intermediaries/
177 See David Robinson, Following the Money: A Better Way Forward on the PROTECT IP Act,
Information Society Project Working Paper Series, No. 1,
http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/6564.htm.
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the key purposes of drug reimbursement programs must be to promote affordable
access to pharmaceuticals, not mere availability of the products themselves. This
concern applies throughout the proposal.
B. X.2: Transparency Related to Healthcare Technologies.
The provision creates a vague requirement that “all measures” related to
pharmaceutical reimbursement be administered in an “objective” manner. This
concept of “objective” administration of the law is not a current U.S. legal
requirement and is not defined in the agreement. What it means in this context is
unclear, which may open opportunities for pharmaceutical companies to attempt to
define it through litigation. What is a non‐objective administration of the law?
Would the choosing of drugs for a formulary based on a multitude of factors
including price and availability decisions pass the test?
C. X.3: Procedural Fairness Related to Healthcare Technologies.
This is the core section forcing countries to use formal rulemaking processes
rather than market negotiations to determine reimbursement prices. International
law should not determine this important policy choice. Countries must be free to use
reimbursement programs as a player in the market rather than as its regulator.
1.

X.3(a)

The term “reasonable period” has no definition in the agreement or in U.S. or
international law. It invites litigation.
2.

X.3(b)

The requirement to disclose all methodologies used to negotiate drug prices is
one of many rules forcing the government to operate as a price regulator rather
than market participant. Private companies do not disclose such information to
their suppliers.
3.

X.3(c)

The requirement to give notice and comment opportunities during
reimbursement decisions prevents health authorities from using negotiation rather
regulation to set drug prices. Private entities do not invite public comments on their
negotiations with suppliers.
4.

X.3(d)

This is one of the most worrisome provisions in the text. The provision has two
parts:
•

The first part encourages countries to abandon any economy of scale benefits
from pooled purchasing through government and instead reimburse
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pharmaceutical companies at rates “consisting of competitive market‐driven
prices in the Party’s territory.” (The restriction to “in the Party’s territory”
was not included in previous agreements and is designed to restrict
countries from the common practice of using international reference prices
to determine reasonable reimbursement rates.) This rule is not followed in
the U.S. Medicaid programs receive discounts of up to 50% off the list price
for pharmaceuticals due to their increased purchasing power. The provision
is also practically unworkable since other large private purchasers in the
market will not be under any obligation to disclose their “market‐driven”
prices.
•

The second part of this section, read with paragraph (i), provides that if
countries do not set reimbursement prices at the “competitive market‐
driven” price, then they must provide companies with appeals of whether
reimbursement prices “appropriately recognize the value” of patents. There
is no objective measure of the “value” of a patent. Economists normally
define value as a function of market price. But in a monopoly market for an
essential good, particularly in countries with high income inequality, this
market price will be excessively high absent government regulation. It is
impossible to know how this provision would be implemented. It invites
litigation and promotes uncertainty.
5.

X.3(e)

This provision mandates that countries allow companies to “apply for an
increased amount” of reimbursement based on evidence of “superior safety, efficacy
or quality.” This provision is potentially beneficial in embracing the idea that prices
should be set based on efficacy rather than market value. Nonetheless, affordability
concerns must also be an integral part of reimbursement decisions, but are not
mentioned.
6.

X.3(f)

This provision mandates that governments allow companies to “apply” for
reimbursements for additional medical indications for products. The provision has
no requirement that the additional indications applied for first be approved by the
government’s medical registration authorities. It rather suggests that the safety and
efficacy information would be submitted directly to the reimbursement entity, side
stepping regulatory authorities.
7.

X.3(g, h, i)

These provisions require that governments provide written reasons for every
decision [(g) and (h)] and then provide an “independent appeal” of any
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reimbursement decision (i), presumably based on the substantive restrictions on
reimbursement programs defined in X.2(d). These provisions will likely increase
pharmaceutical company negotiating power to exact higher prices from
governments through litigation threats.
8.

X.3(k)

This provision requires that all members of reimbursement committees be made
public, presumably to enable targeted lobbying from pharmaceutical companies.
Such lobbying can be detrimental to public decision making, especially when linked
to unethical gift giving that has plagued pharmaceutical marketing in the U.S. and
elsewhere.
D. X.4: Dissemination of Information to Health Professionals and Consumers
This provision attempts to set drug marketing policy through trade agreements.
It would mandate that countries allow certain kinds of direct‐to‐consumer and
direct‐to‐physician marketing efforts over the internet. This is a subject currently
subject to regulatory investigations in the U.S. and would be contrary to the drug
marketing laws of many countries. The provision would appear to make illegal a
proposal by Representative Waxman that companies not be allowed to engage in
certain kinds of direct to consumer promotion in the first three years of a drug’s
time on the market.
E. X.5: Ethical business practices [no text]
As in other areas of the TPP, provisions protecting corporate concerns are well
developed and those potentially protecting consumers are absent. This section
should consider standards that would ban gift giving and other pecuniary
relationships between pharmaceutical companies and prescribers or government
health officials. It should ban off‐label marketing of drugs. It should mandate private
and public rights of action against fraudulent and misleading marketing practices.
F. X.6: Cooperation
As in the agreed principles, this provision appears tailored to promote a
conception of “availability” that does not include affordability. The key concern of
countries in the region, and in particular the U.S., should be on sharing information
on how best to ensure the affordability of medicines in the context of the ongoing
economic crisis.
G. X.7: Definitions
Few of the key terms in the agreement are defined, including “access,” “value,”
“reimbursement” and “health care programs” as applied to the scope of coverage,
“transparent,” “verifiable,” “objective,” “competitive‐market derived,” “independent”
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as related to “appeal or review.”
H. X.7 fn 2. (U.S. carve out?)
In previous agreements with the U.S. including pharmaceutical chapters, the U.S.
has claimed that they have no application to programs in the U.S. This in part
because the largest federal drug reimbursement program in the U.S. – included in
the Medicaid program – is administered by state governments (although created by
federal statute). The Australian and Korean agreements were crafted to apply to the
“central” level of government. The KORUS agreement included a footnote stating:
“For greater certainty, Medicaid is a regional level of government health care
program in the United States, not a central level of government program.”
The Medicaid carve out in the Korea FTA has been criticized in the U.S. for
potentially leaving vulnerable other U.S. programs that control prices on drugs in
government programs in similar ways as the Korean and Australian governments,
including through Medicare and the so‐called 340b program for community
hospitals. TPP removes this footnote form the proposed text and substitutes a
bracketed place holder for clarification of the scope of application. This should be
concerning to US health advocates and officials. A letter from several senior
members of the US Congress, released during the Chicago round of negotiations,
instructed that “TPP should not undermine either U.S. or other member countries'
current or prospective, non‐discriminatory drug reimbursement policies and
programs (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, the VA, and other programs).”
Indeed, there are strong voices in the U.S. in opposition to any restrictions on
reimbursement programs within TPP, even if they do effectively carve out all
existing U.S. programs. Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin wrote President Obama
with respect to a possible TPP pharmaceutical chapter:
Even if a chapter was proposed that did include a Medicaid carve‐out, state leaders
believe it is inappropriate for U.S. trade policy to advance restrictions on pharmaceutical
pricing programs that U.S. programs do not meet but for technical carve outs.178

CONCLUSION
The U.S. proposals, if adopted, would create the highest intellectual property
protection and enforcement standards in any free trade agreement to date. If
adopted, the TPP would predictably lead to higher prices and decreased access to a
broad range of consumer products in many TPP member countries, from medicines
to textbooks to information on the internet, with little or no benefit to any TPP
178

Letter from Peter Shumlin, Governor, Vt. to President Barack Obama (June 1, 2011), available at
http://www.forumdemocracy.net/downloads/Letter%20from%20VT%20Gov.%20Shumlin%20to%20Presi
dent%20Obama%20-%20June%201,%202011.pdf.
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member in the form of increased innovation, creativity or local economic activity.
Despite the broad ranging impact so the agreement on the public, it is being
negotiated under conditions of secrecy that are inimical to the construction of good
public policy. Negotiating legislative minimum standards agreements through
processes where the public affected by those norms cannot observe the standards
being discussed, much less participate in their creation, is an affront to democracy
and the principles of good government. We advise that all members of the TPP
negotiation reject the maximalist standards of the U.S. proposal and move the
debate of global intellectual property norms to an open and transparent process
where a full range of stakeholders can observe and participate.
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